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ABSTRACT 
Outsourcing of indirect procurement is receiving much attention in Bangladesh recently. The 
procurement outsourcing market is moving closer to entering a “rapid growth” phase. Yet, 
not enough is known about the various factors that are driving or impeding outsourcing and 
whether sufficient value is obtained or expected from outsourcing when compared with the 
situation prevailing prior to or without outsourcing. 
The author is on the verge of completing the 15 subjects required to obtain MCIPS from CIPS 
(Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply) and that theoretical knowledge is applied in 
Bangladesh context to develop a better understanding of the topic through an empirical survey 
based study. 
Procurement competence, procurement competitive advantage, firm competitive advantage 
and business risk constituted the key focus areas for the study. 
Respondents were picked from Bangladesh based firms and tried to limit the respondents 
within members of the CIPS or IEB (Institute of Engineers)
 
representing various levels in the 
supply chain practice within their organizations. 
Data collected through the physical mailing survey method and also from some personally 
known professional whose competence is beyond question, were analyzed using statistical 
techniques. The total of 197 valid responses received.  
The study found certain statistically significant differences between firms that have 
outsourced their indirect procurement function (OS) compared to firms that have either not 
considered outsourcing (NUC) or considered but decided against (CDA) or outsourced but 
later in-sourced (IS) or presently have outsourcing still under consideration (UC). The 
differences were found to be more widespread and significant in respect of procurement 
competence, procurement competitive advantage and firm competitive advantage. They were 
less pronounced for business risk and procurement-transformation-and-end-to-end 
competence (the latter was found to be a separate factor within the earlier more generic, 
procurement competence area). 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
1.1 Background 
The recent years have witnessed a spurt in outsourcing activity particularly in Bangladesh. 
Areas covered by outsourcing are typically human resources, customer care, finance and 
accounting, and more recently procurement. The business sectors that are getting most 
heavily into outsourcing are manufacturing, retail, telecom and financial services.  
 According to Everest, “Procurement outsourcing has the potential to become the biggest 
„game changer‟ in business process outsourcing.” 1 
 The focus of this research is on indirect procurement outsourcing. Indirect procurement 
refers to the procurement of those goods and / or services that do not end up in the final 
product delivered to the customer.  
 Procurement outsourcing refers to the transfer of any specific procurement activity or set of 
activities to a third party in order to achieve certain business objectives such as reduction in 
procurement cost or spend (through operational cost reduction, savings realization, etc.), 
ability to concentrate better and faster on certain strategic or core procurement activities or 
priorities, improvement in compliance with procurement policies and procedures, etc. For the 
purpose of this study, procurement related support activities such as procurement helpdesk or 
maintenance of the procurement IT platform are also included.  
 It is estimated that roughly 98 percent
2
 of all procurement outsourcing engagements fall 
within the exclusive domain of indirect procurement outsourcing. Typically considered non-
core, indirect procurement spend in categories such as temporary labor, travel or 
entertainment services, office supplies, marketing / print / advertising, IT, telecom, and 
facilities management is sought to be contained by firms facing ever increasing cost pressures 
in order to remain competitive in a globally interconnected world. In some rare cases, 
                                                 
1
 Everest Research Institute. (2009). “Procurement Outsourcing (PO) Annual Report. Topic: 
Shifting Buyer Preferences Dictate New Engagement Models.” 
2
 Atkinson, W. (2006). “Outsourcing lands in procurement.” Purchasing.com. 
Available at: http://www.purchasing.com/article/CA6315354.html. 
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categories such as transportation and logistics are also candidates for outsourcing. Specific 
activities that fall within the purview of outsourcing can vary significantly, depending on the 
client‟s particular situation. 
 However, typical areas include analysis of requirements, supplier selection, strategic 
sourcing, contracting, vendor management, day-to-day purchasing and invoicing and 
accounts payable. It is possible to outsource activities for one or more indirect spend 
categories, combining (in rare cases), even some direct spend category or categories In some 
arrangements, procurement departments outsource portion of the „Spend‟ that has been 
managed internally. In other instances, though, the indirect spend is still being managed by 
the individual departments and is then directly outsourced to a third-party provider, 
completely bypassing the procurement department and, in essence, having no impact on them 
at all. For example, if a company's human resources department, rather than the purchasing 
department, handles procurement of temporary labor, then the decision to outsource that 
activity has no prospective impact on the purchasing department. 
The main reasons for outsourcing indirect procurement are: cost pressures, ability to tap into 
readily available procurement skills through service provider firms rather than having to build 
the organization internally for the purpose (which in many cases is difficult to retain in any 
case), ability to obtain, integrate, deploy and maintain technology options faster through 
outsourcing, ability to obtain faster compliance ramp-up for higher realized savings through 
outsourcing, etc. Specialized procurement knowledge and volume generated leverage can 
help lower procurement costs for the firm.   Yet, despite the huge potential for growth of 
procurement outsourcing, not enough is understood about the factors that differentiate firms 
that have outsourced their indirect procurement against those that have not yet outsourced 
(for which the scenarios are: not yet considered outsourcing, considered but decided against 
outsourcing, or presently still have outsourcing under consideration; there is one more which 
has to do with firms that did outsource but later decided to in-source). The research is aimed 
at reducing this gap in understanding. While there has been general research on outsourcing, 
the focus has been greater on areas of human resources (HR), customer relationship 
management (CRM), finance and accounting (F&A); within procurement, the focus has 
mainly been on direct rather than indirect procurement. Indirect procurement has been the 
3 
focus of some studies by consulting firms and trade magazines; research on indirect 
procurement outsourcing is practically very few.
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1.2 Research Objectives 
 
Broadly, the research objectives are: 
 • Identify some of the key factors that are relevant to indirect procurement outsourcing.  
• Find out the differences (in terms of the key factors identified), between those that have 
outsourced and those that have not with survey-based input from a range of procurement 
professionals working for Bangladesh based firms. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
1. What are the key factors in indirect procurement outsourcing? What differentiating 
comparisons can be made between firms that have outsourced and those that have not in 
terms of their levels of satisfaction on each of the key factors before (or without) outsourcing 
and their expected or actual level of satisfaction from outsourcing?  
 2. How do firms representing different outsourcing scenarios compare on considerations 
such as importance ascribed to procurement by the firm, extent of collaboration that exists 
between the client firm and service provider firm, perception of the extent to which 
procurement outsourcing can improve benefits for the firm or result in loss of control over the 
procurement function.   
 
1.4 Contributions of the Research   
 
The research will further the understanding of indirect procurement outsourcing by taking an 
encompassing look at the prevailing state of the discipline in Bangladesh in  terms of how far 
outsourcing is expected to meet and is indeed actually meeting those expectations (or falling 
short), in comparison to without outsourcing. Outsourcing status based comparisons of firms 
that have outsourced and those that have not, bring to the fore some basic differences that can 
                                                 
3
 Same as Note 1 
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be the focus of further investigation and research.  This has important implications for 
professional associations in the field of supply chain or procurement, service providers, third 
party advising firms, trade magazines and indeed, academic research.  
Sales professionals can benefit from the research in various ways. An early assessment of a 
prospective client on a fairly broad-based set of factors, in terms of existing satisfaction or 
risk perception levels and expectations from outsourcing, can help better understand the 
opportunity areas where the value proposition needs to be built. It can also help disengage 
faster from opportunities that are “not likely to go anywhere soon;” This can be good for the 
client too (e.g. if the time is not yet ripe – an organization that erroneously believes its 
procurement competitive advantage to be already high as evidenced in their request for 
proposal (RFP) document or in discussions, will take time till it is prepared to accept the true 
base case, something that is vital for an apples-to-apples business case comparison with the 
one proposed by a prospective service provider and on which the win will ultimately depend 
in large measure; the client needs to do its own internal analysis and validation first without 
getting distracted in working with prospective service providers on the RFP).  
 
1.5 Overview of the Study   
 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to indirect procurement outsourcing and gives an 
overview of the research. Chapter 2 reviews outsourcing in the context of the highly emotive 
topic that it is and the debate it has engendered. It then examines the relevance or significance 
of the topic and discusses the available body of literature and the direction that research has 
taken. Chapter 3 develops the research model based on a review of transactional cost 
economics, resource based view of the firm and agency theory and then proceeds to develop 
the constructs that could aid an understanding of the topic of indirect procurement 
outsourcing. Research questions and hypotheses are also developed here. Chapter 4 discusses 
the research methodology detailing the manner in which data was collected, describes the 
study population, the sampling procedure and, the survey instrument with which to measure 
latent variables. Chapter 5 lays out the data analysis and results. Chapter 6 concludes the 
dissertation with a discussion on each of the research questions and the available evidence to 
support or refute the hypotheses, implications for practice, limitations of the research and 
directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws from various sources. First, the general topic of outsourcing and the 
debate that has taken place in recent years are reviewed. Second, the specific significance of 
indirect procurement outsourcing within the larger context of services outsourcing (as distinct 
from manufacturing outsourcing) is discussed. Third, the present body of literature on 
indirect procurement outsourcing (PO) is reviewed in order to understand its relevance, value 
proposition, and the direction that research on this topic has taken.  
2.2 Outsourcing: An emotive and highly debated topic  
Outsourcing refers to work contracted to an outside firm, either within country or out of 
country.  The Institute of Supply Management defines the terms as: Outsourcing
4: “A version 
of the make-or-buy decision in which an organization elects to purchase an item that 
previously was made or a service that was performed in-house; often utilized for services. It 
involves sourcing and using a supplier that provides the completed item or service rather than 
buying the components and manufacturing them in-house.” Off-shoring (or “offshore 
sourcing”)5 is outsourcing overseas or in a separate country. 
 
Figure 1: Research Scope (Source: CAPS Research and A. T. Kearney Inc., 2005) 
 
                                                 
4
 Institute for Supply Management. Official position statement: outsourcing. Available at: 
http://www.ism.ws/files/About/PSOffshoring-1.pdf 
5
 Same as 4 
 
6 
Outsourcing to a contiguous country may be considered near-shore outsourcing. At the outset 
it is appropriate to mention that for the purpose of this study, the scope of the research shall 
be as shown in figure 2 (i.e. quadrants 3 and 4)
6
.                                   
The Journal of Economic Perspectives article titled, “The Muddles over Outsourcing”, sought 
to provide a balanced perspective on outsourcing. The article concludes, “A productive public 
debate about outsourcing might usefully begin by restricting the “outsourcing” phraseology 
to services traded internationally at arm‟s length and principally on-line: what the WTO calls 
Mode I services” (where supplier and buyer remain in their respective locations). This is 
apart from Mode 2: where the service recipient moves to the location of the service provider 
(as in tourism), Mode 3: where the service provider establishes a commercial presence in 
another country, requiring an element of direct foreign investment and Mode 4: where the 
service seller moves to the location of the service buyer (as in construction and consulting 
services). “Finally, it would be useful to discuss outsourcing as a trade phenomenon, with 
effects that are not qualitatively different from those of conventional trade in goods. Thus, 
outsourcing leads to gains from trade and increases in national income, with the caveats that 
are standard in this literature. At a policy level, one needs to be concerned about workers who 
are displaced from certain sectors. But outsourcing is not a small step that will take a 
preponderance of workers off the edge of an abyss into prolonged unemployment and re-
employment only at low wages.  
2.3 Indirect PO: Relevance, Value Proposition (Global Perspective)  
It is estimated that the savings from PO can be nearly five times the savings from outsourcing 
other process areas such as F&A, HR, etc. (Everest, 2007)
7
. PO is therefore considered a 
highly attractive means for driving higher profitability and productivity in industry – a 
potential “game changer.” Compared to outsourcing arrangements in most other areas where 
the focus is mainly on efficiency improvements and headcount reductions, PO can generate 
additional savings through sourcing and compliance. It can also be an opportunity to 
transform the procurement organization in order to extract the more durable and strategic 
benefits. Accenture
8
, in their 2003 Procurement Survey projected that in the three years 
following (i.e., till 2006), PO activity would increase significantly: from 22 percent that used 
                                                 
6
 Monczka, R. M., Markham, W. J., Carter, J. R., Blascovich J. D. & Slaight, T. H. (2005). “Outsourcing 
Strategically for Sustainable Competitive Advantage.” A Joint Research Study by CAPS Research and A. 
7
 Everest Research Institute. (2007). “Procurement Outsourcing Annual Report.” 
8
 Accenture. (2003). “Procurement Outsourcing: The Next Wave – 2003 Procurement Survey.” Available at: 
http://www.accenture.com/NR/rdonlyres/81B904F9-E0F1-4634-B0D1-
914DA5ABCFAF/0/procurement_outsourcing.pdf 
7 
a Procurement Service Provider (PSP) to 47 percent. It found that the incidence was higher 
for indirect PO compared to direct – projected to increase from 20 percent to 43 percent 
(2003 to 2006) compared to from nine percent to 22 percent for direct (it appears there is an 
error in these numbers since the weighted average of 20 and 9 cannot be 22 and the weighted 
average of 43 and 22 cannot be 47; despite the apparent error, the key point Accenture tried 
to make was that indirect PO was likely to see significant growth. The survey was broad 
based covering 15 countries spread across U.S. and Europe. It found that U.S. PO was likely 
to grow from 19 percent to 58 percent, the largest projected increase of all countries during 
the period. Of the 219 responses (only executive responses were solicited), the U.S. responses 
represented 12 percent – a rather small sample. Taken together with projections from Everest, 
it appears that there were “great expectations” of growth in PO, both in 2003 and 2006. 
Indications are that growth has fallen somewhat short of levels then projected. Though the 
overall growth of 30 percent has been sustained, it is attributable more to the expansion of 
existing contracts than the signing of new ones. 
Analyses and reasons for some apparent shortfall in the growth trajectory of indirect 
procurement outsourcing need therefore to be reviewed and analyzed through independent 
research. Indeed, Hadyn Jones and Jules Goffre of A. T. Kearney summarize the insights and 
conclusions gained at the 2006 CPO Club retreat in Lisbon in their paper bearing the rather 
skeptical title, “Procurement Outsourcing: A Pathway to Value or a Road to Nowhere.”9 A 
separate study by Aberdeen Group, found that of the 260 enterprises surveyed, 27 percent 
currently outsource some form of procurement, another 13 percent are likely to outsource 
within the next two years and the balance 60 percent have no plans to outsource
10
. 
Independent (e.g. academic), objective verification of the extent of indirect PO, present or 
proposed, is lacking; also lacking is research on the topic covering a broader spectrum of 
firms, rather than some of the bigger firms alone. It may be mentioned that the Accenture 
survey had 17 percent responses from firms with annual spend less than 0.5 billion Euro, 47 
percent between 0.5 billion and 5 billion Euro, 14 percent between 5 billion and 10 billion 
Euro and 22 percent more than 10 billion Euro. Such a sample does not appear to be a 
random sample: the spend figures indicate a sample bias in favor of larger firms. For the 
purpose of the present research, the sample taken will be seen to be representative of 
                                                 
9
 Jones, H. & Goffre, J. (2006). “Procurement Outsourcing: A Pathway to Value or a Road to Nowhere.” 
European CPO Club, Lisbon Proceedings. Copyright: A. T. Kearney. 
10
 Aberdeen Group. (2007). “Procurement Outsourcing: A Strategic Imperative.” Available at: 
http://www.sourceoneinc.com/downloads/Procurement_Outsourcing_Report.pdf 
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Bangladeshi various organizations and will be discussed in the chapter on Research 
Methodology. 
Accenture found from their survey that 42 percent of CEO‟s did not consider indirect 
procurement as core compared to 18 percent of CEO‟s who did not consider direct 
procurement as core. Separately, Atkinson (2006) found that 98 percent of all PO 
engagements are in the domain of indirect procurement. Though the 98 percent number of 
2006 seems to be far higher than the earlier Accenture study of 2003 would indicate (which 
had indirect PO to direct PO percentages at 20 percent and 9 percent respectively: part of the 
explanation may be the inherent bias in the type of sample taken), it is important to note that 
there is agreement that indirect procurement is the area more favored for ready growth for 
PO. The argument for indirect PO is: what is not a core competency for a certain company 
can be catered better by outsourcing to another company for which the same scope area is a 
core competency. Apart from the opportunity to improve efficiencies for indirect spend 
(which is more often considered non-core) through PO, it is widely believed that significant 
savings can also result from repositioning and centralizing large numbers of people and 
technologies and avoiding burdensome investments in upgrades and new systems. In 
addition, channeling more spend through aggregated contracts and increased compliance, can 
cut a company‟s cost of goods sold (one study indicates a figure of as much as four percent 
for a raise in compliance from 60 percent to 95 percent)
11
.Across the board, it is not 
considered uncommon for PO to reduce the cost of materials and services by up to 15 
percent. In terms of the sequence or progression of outsourcing, Accenture found that 
physical asset based services (e.g. logistics services such as transportation, distribution, 
manufacturing, warehousing) are normally the ones to be outsourced by firms on priority as 
service providers are able to offer cost reduction through better asset utilization. Business 
processes that are less asset-intensive, such as HR, finance and accounting, product 
development and procurement come next; in none of the cases did Accenture find that a firm 
had outsourced or was planning to outsource these less asset-intensive business process areas 
without having outsourced some logistical or IT areas first. It is possible that Accenture, 
Everest etc. have deliberately been somewhat more focused on larger firms that could 
generate faster and more substantive sales revenues and therefore be more worthy of 
spending time and resources on. But, smaller firms too may be amenable to pursuing 
                                                 
11
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outsourcing and be deserving candidates for a better understanding of the PO attributes that 
fit their requirements. Taken together, this segment of smaller firms may very well offer a 
larger opportunity for PO than some of the larger firms put together ever will. 
Clients that have outsourced or plan to outsource their procurement function have the option 
of choosing from among the various areas of the procurement (or related areas) outsource 
first. It appears that IT aspects of procurement such as e-Procurement, e- Hosting, followed 
by transactional activities such as requisition to payment have seen higher incidence of 
outsourcing than the more strategic areas such as strategic sourcing. Often, the client may 
want to test the waters and reach a certain comfort level with service delivery in less strategic 
areas of procurement before gaining the confidence to delve into areas that are considered 
more strategic. Accenture (2003) found that satisfaction levels were especially high in areas 
that firms consider to be priority areas for PO. The next chapter will detail the model for 
ascertaining whether this is indeed true. One of the reasons for undertaking PO is that it can 
help keep organizational top performers happy. The best sourcing professionals want to focus 
on strategic purchases where the maximum impact can be created, not tactical or order 
management related issues pertaining to certain indirect spend categories where impact 
potential is rather limited. On the other hand, PSP‟s can aggregate volume and expertise 
across clients to a point where specialized professionals can be hired and kept happy 
addressing larger, leveraged volumes of opportunities (spend, transactions, etc.). Gottfredson, 
Puryear and Phillipstalk of skills and scale in the following words: “Migrating from a 
vertically integrated company to a specialized provider of a single function is not a winning 
strategy for everyone. But all companies need to rigorously assess each of their functions to 
determine in which they have sufficient scale and differentiated skills and in which they 
don‟t. Greater focus on capability sourcing (sometimes called „right sourcing) can improve a 
company‟s strategic position by reducing costs, streamlining the organization, and improving 
quality. Finding more qualified partners to provide critical functions usually allow companies 
to enhance the core capabilities that drive competitive advantage in their industries.” 
For process areas such as F&A, HR, and CRM, the value proposition from outsourcing 
derives mainly from operational cost reduction. Therefore, most FTE‟s for these scope areas 
are positioned in low cost countries in order to obtain the benefit of labor arbitrage. On the 
other hand, the most value for PO can come through negotiated sourcing savings which 
typically require significant domestic presence of FTE‟s. Depending on the scope, the mix of 
FTE‟s for delivering PO service to a particular client will vary: routine, transactional scope 
10 
areas requiring greater emphasis on improvement in areas such as process, automation, cycle 
time, etc., will tend to have a greater proportion of the FTE‟s in low cost countries that have 
an abundance of adequately skilled resources. On the other hand, PO contracts having 
sourcing spend in scope will require significant domestic presence (on client site and / or 
remote) in order to effectively interact with client business units, suppliers, etc.  
The focus of this research is on indirect procurement outsourcing. It is estimated that roughly 
98 percent of all procurement outsourcing engagements fall within the exclusive domain of 
indirect procurement outsourcing. It has been seen that significant differences exist between 
how organizations view procurement: in some organizations, procurement is deeply involved 
in the strategy-setting process; in others, the role is more limited and focused mainly on 
transactional activities. As in the case of IT in the years prior (mid 1980‟s), where IT 
executives had to decide the direction their firms' IT strategy would take (e.g. develop into a 
strategic weapon, become an internal utility, transition to an outsourced service), the CPO‟s 
should strive to play a major role in deciding the fate of their organizations. The ready 
availability and power of internet tools, increased volume and quantity of supply needs and 
options, increasingly transparent market economics, global sourcing requiring in-depth 
country knowledge, and growth and capability of outsourcing firms are all factors that 
together or in any combination can be the triggers for PO. The shape of the procurement 
organization will depend on the potential path or paths chosen to be best suited (figure). In 
the “strategic weapon” role, procurement combines the supply market for sources of 
customer-facing innovation and revenue generation with creating strategic cost advantage. 
Strategic insight and technical capabilities to support outsourcing play a role in this equation.  
 
Figure 2: Procurement Outsourcing at a Turning Point 
(Source: Carter, Markham, and Monczka - Supply Chain Management Review, 2007)                           
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For activities with no strategic impact, the company could leverage an internal utility or adopt 
a shared services approach in the interest of managing at optimal efficiency and cost. Under 
this option, the activities remain in-house, with emphasis on internal scale and scope to drive 
procurement effectiveness. Finally, in areas where the procurement organization adds no 
Strategic value or the company lacks internal scale to operate at high levels of effectiveness, 
transitioning to an outsourced procurement service can be a logical course. 
In the study, “Outsourcing Strategically for Sustainable Competitive Advantage,” 160 Chief 
Procurement Officers (CPO‟s) were asked to provide the level of PO for six main categories 
of expenditure: direct materials, MRO (maintenance, repairs and operating supplies), indirect 
purchases, capital expenditures, services, and goods for resale. For each category, the CPO‟s 
had to respond to current and expected levels of PO across three types of activities: strategic 
procurement (category and commodity strategy, supplier selection), supplier management 
(supplier assessment and evaluation, supplier development and certification), transaction 
processing (ordering, replenishment, payment and settlement, coding and catalog 
management and procurement information systems management). The responses obtained 
from the study indicate that PO was not widespread, that it had been adopted more widely for 
transaction processing than for other activities, that it had wider adoption for categories tied 
 
Figure 3: Procurement Outsourcing – Current and Planned 
(Source: Carter, Markham, and Monczka - Supply Chain Management Review, 2007) 
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more closely to the core of the business (e.g. revenue linkages for direct materials and goods 
for resale, and business infrastructure for capital expenditures) and that even after 18 months 
the increase was somewhat modest (compared to a later Everest projection in 2007 of 35 
percent growth. 
While it is evident that the topic of PO has been generating a fair deal of interest, most 
publications on the subject lack the rigor necessary for objective, impartial, representative 
research. 
 
2.4 Summary   
This chapter reviewed the special significance of the topic of outsourcing, especially in the 
context of the present global economic crisis. The impact in terms of number of FTE‟s, 
domestic for Bangladesh as well as international, both from outsourcing in general and 
indirect procurement outsourcing in particular were presented at some length to obtain an 
understanding about the extent of the human impact arising from this practice of outsourcing. 
Economic issues as well as the value proposition from outsourcing were discussed and it was 
found that most research into indirect procurement outsourcing was through consulting firms 
(Everest Group, Accenture, Aberdeen Group, etc.) and very little independent academic 
research had been conducted. Based on the evidence in this chapter, the development of the 
research model is attempted in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH MODEL 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a model of factors that are considered important to indirect procurement 
outsourcing. The model will be developed based on a review of available theory and 
literature, trade as well as academic. It will also incorporate various aspects of sourcing, 
operations, sales and solutions, and delivery; creating and bidding optimal value proposals for 
indirect PO to various clients covering different industry sectors and diagnosing waste areas 
and application of lean value levers to improve value of PO service. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Models   
Several theoretical Models are applicable in the study of procurement outsourcing. Among 
them are: Transactional Cost Economics (TCE),Resource Based View of the firm (RBV), the 
industry view (IV)
12
.These theories establish the framework for outsourcing evaluation and 
management, a framework that encompasses business strategy, economics and inter-
organizational relationships. It may be noted that there has been increasing recognition in 
literature of the role that factors beyond the purely economic play and hence the attention to 
business strategy and inter-organizational behavior in outsourcing. Another theory that is 
applicable for outsourcing is Agency Theory. Agency theory suggests that the firm can be 
viewed as a nexus of contracts (loosely defined) between resource holders
13
. An agency 
relationship arises whenever one or more individuals, called principals, hire one or more 
other individuals, called agents, to perform some service and then delegate decision-making 
authority to the agents. The primary agency relationships in business are those (1) between 
stockholders and managers and (2) between debt holders and stockholders. These 
relationships are not necessarily harmonious; indeed, agency theory is concerned with so-
called agency conflicts, or conflicts of interest between agents and principals. Agency theory 
raises a fundamental problem in organizations – self-interested behavior. A corporation's 
managers may have personal goals that compete with the owner's goal of maximization of 
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shareholder wealth. Since the shareholders authorize managers to administer the firm's assets, 
a potential conflict of interest exists between the two groups. Agency theory suggests that, in 
imperfect labor and capital markets, managers will seek to maximize their own utility at the 
expense of corporate shareholders. Agents have the ability to operate in their own self-
interest rather than in the best interests of the firm because of asymmetric information (e.g., 
managers know better than shareholders whether they are capable of meeting the 
shareholders' objectives) and uncertainty (e.g., myriad factors contribute to final outcomes, 
and it may not be evident whether the agent directly caused a given outcome, positive or 
negative). Evidence of self-interested managerial behavior includes the consumption of some 
corporate resources in the form of perquisites and the avoidance of optimal risk positions, 
whereby risk-averse managers bypass profitable opportunities in which the firm's 
shareholders would prefer they invest. Outside investors may recognize that the firm will 
make decisions contrary to their best interests; accordingly, investors may discount the prices 
they are willing to pay for the firm's securities. Procurement managers, in deliberations over 
whether or not to outsource as well as in subsequent actions, may indulge in behavior that 
falls within the ambit of agency theory. 
 
3.3 Transaction Cost Economics   
Transactional cost economics, (TCE) associated with the work of Oliver E. Williamson 
represents one of the most influential attempts to develop an economic theory that takes 
seriously the structure of firms
14
. Previously, economic theories tended to treat the firm as a 
sort of “black box,” the internal workings of which were not considered to be important. In 
many ways, transactional cost economics attempts to explain why firms exist – why are some 
transactions directed by managers in the context of a hierarchy, as opposed to taking place in 
an open market? It is more accurate, though, to say that TCE tries to explain the particular 
structure of a firm, most importantly, the extent to which it will integrate vertically
15
. (The 
term vertical integration refers to the process in which several steps in the production and / or 
distribution of a product or service are controlled) by a single company or entity, in order to 
increase that company‟s or entity‟s power in the marketplace). 
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While it is acknowledged that profit maximization by firms requires rational, cost 
minimization behavior by owners and / or managers, TCE is different in that it stresses 
transaction costs as well as production costs. Williamson considers production costs as 
analogous to the costs of building and running an “ideal” machine while transaction costs are 
incurred by departures (such as friction) from such perfection. In economic terms, the “ideal” 
machine would be a perfectly efficient market. However, it would require full information to 
be available to all parties and perfect competition, among other factors. Departures (or 
“market failures”) can lead to additional costs; e.g. lack of information can lead to paying too 
high a price for a good or service. Bad debt can result from lack of information about a 
customer‟s creditworthiness. Under some circumstances transaction costs may be lower if the 
transaction takes place in an open market, while in others, they may be lower under 
hierarchical or alliance forms of governance structures. 
Ronald Harry Coase
16
 (who influenced Williamson) in his essay, “The Nature of the Firm,” 
explained why the economy is populated by a number of business firms instead of consisting 
exclusively of a multitude of independent, self-employed people, who contract with one 
another. Given that production can be carried out without any organization, why and under 
what conditions do firms arise? Coase examines the conditions under which an entrepreneur 
seeks hired help instead of simply contracting out the task or set of tasks. Contrary to 
traditional economic theory which argued in favor of the market as the most efficient 
mechanism (whereby those best at providing goods and services most cheaply were already 
doing so), Coase noted that there were a number of transaction costs that applied in addition 
to using the market: search and information costs, bargaining costs, keeping trade secrets, 
policing and information costs – all of which can potentially add to the cost of procuring 
something with a firm. This suggested that firms would arise when they could arrange to 
produce what they needed internally and thereby avoid some of these costs. There is a natural 
limit to what can be produced internally, however. Coase underscores "decreasing returns to 
the entrepreneur function", including increasing overhead costs and increasing propensity for 
an overwhelmed manager to make mistakes in resource allocation – costs that can be 
considered as countervailing costs to the use of the firm. Coase argues that the size of a firm 
(as measured by how many contractual relations are "internal" to the firm and how many 
"external") is a result of finding an optimal balance between the competing tendencies of the 
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costs outlined above. In general, making the firm larger will initially be advantageous, but the 
decreasing returns indicated above will eventually kick in, preventing the firm from growing 
indefinitely. From a procurement outsourcing standpoint, certain scope areas may be decided 
by the firm to remain internal (for a variety of reasons) while others are identified as prime 
candidates for outsourcing. TCE lays down two assumptions that are unchanging contextual 
factors in all organizations: bounded rationality and opportunism. Adopted from the work of 
Herbert Simon
17
 who contended, “Nothing is more important in setting our research methods 
than our view of the nature of human beings whose behavior we are studying,” bounded 
rationality and opportunism explain cognition and self-interest in human behavior. 
Bounded rationality refers to our inability to process all the information at our disposal or 
accurately work out the consequences of the information that we possess. As in the game of 
chess where different conclusions and results are achieved by the opponents playing to the 
same rules: no one is capable of faultlessly analyzing the tremendous complexity of any 
given position which presents too many alternatives and no one can account for the 
unpredictable actions of others that impose a dependency on the sequence of events; so also 
in the case of managers, no matter how knowledgeable or smart they may be, they just cannot 
consider all the possible alternative courses of action. The unpredictability of how 
competitors may react only adds to the complexity. From an outsourcing perspective too it 
has to be assumed that there is bounded rationality at work. This will apply both to 
stakeholders / managers in the client firm (the one that is outsourcing or considering 
outsourcing) as well as stakeholders / managers in the service provider (or potential service 
provider) firm. Competitor reaction adds to the unpredictability and the complexity: when 
Unilever decided to outsource aspects of its procurement function, they had no way of 
knowing how one of their competitors, e.g., Colgate, would react or whether a similar action 
was underway with them (i.e. Colgate) as well, quite independent of Unilever‟s own choice 
of governance structure (i.e., outsourcing strategy).Opportunism refers to the possibility that 
people (or at least some people) will act in a self-interested way “with guile” (which goes 
beyond just self-interested behavior, which is considered normal), that is, people may not be 
entirely honest and truthful about their intentions, or they might attempt to take advantage of 
unforeseen circumstances that gives them the chance to exploit their situation versus another 
party or other parties. The assumption is not that all people act opportunistically all the time; 
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the assumption is that some of the people will act opportunistically some of the time, and that 
you can’t tell in advance who is an opportunist and who is not. While the CEO of a firm is 
wanting to reduce operational expenses and wants to explore outsourcing, the Chief 
Procurement Officer (CPO) may be exploring the same with a different mindset: e.g., as 
simply an opportunity to engage the top leadership and create awareness of the true value of 
the procurement organization (often in itself a problem within many firms) through ongoing, 
prolonged confabulations through an neutral third party facilitator that shall usher in a 
gradual “maturing of the minds” and better appreciation of the procurement function‟s true 
worth. Or it could simply be playing along, “swimming with the tide,” an approach that tries 
to adapt and respond to what the bosses seem to want and using maneuverability and tact to 
try gravitate organizational consensus for or against outsourcing, deploying in the bargain, 
even tactics that the actor may know better to be simply “guileful.” 
TCE lays down asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency as variables that determine the 
selection of market, alliance or hierarchical structures. Transactions can involve specific or 
non-specific assets, have high or low uncertainty or be frequent or rare. These variables are 
considered key in determining the organizational hue the firm will adopt: market, alliance or 
vertical integration. Other factors being constant, transactions requiring highly specific assets 
can be better supported (in terms of realizing lower transaction costs) through vertical 
integration rather than the market mechanism: e.g., a scope area that allows the outsourcing 
service provider to cater to only one client is likely risky or less sustainable given the context 
of bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Most firms would not want to integrate vertically and bring “in-house” a good or service that 
is very rarely used: e.g., consulting services, unless they can be utilized or deployed across a 
wider base. Still, it is questionable whether the service can be built at a level of expertise that 
allows differentiation enough to be a core competency. Often, it will be more prudent to hire 
external consultants who are adept in their field rather than vertically integrate (even if 
broader application is factored in, which may in fact even risk greater inefficiency through 
deployment of a level of ineptitude across a wider base!).Uncertainty refers to difficulty in 
foreseeing the eventualities that may occur during the course of the transaction. One factor is 
the length of the transaction itself: transactions that take place on “spot markets” have 
relatively little uncertainly since one does not have to predict the future. On the other hand, 
transactions that require a longer term commitment have inherent uncertainty built into them. 
Outsourcing contracts can typically last (say) one to five years – long enough to introduce 
18 
uncertainty from the standpoint of both the client firm as well as the service provider.  Table 
below gives the relationship between asset specificity, uncertainty and the type of governance 
structure that is better suited to each combination: 
 
 
 
Table 1 Relationship between asset specificity, uncertainty, and governance structure 
                            (Source: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~jesu0073/TCE.pdf) 
 
 
Asset Specificity 
 
Low for both parties High for both parties 
High for one party, 
 
Uncertainty High 
Low 
 
Contract / vertical integration Vertical integration Vertical integration 
Spot contract Long-term contract Vertical integration 
  
While outsourcing the procurement function, the same variables of asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency (frequency has traditionally received lesser focus in TCE 
literature) are at play. High asset specificity and uncertainty lead to transactional difficulties 
with the transaction held internally within the firm – hierarchical governance. Firms that are 
on legacy systems have a choice: either to move to more standard platforms or continue with 
the legacy system. Moving to a standard platform reduces the asset specificity and allows a 
structure other than vertical integration to be viable under conditions of both low and high 
uncertainty. On the other hand, a decision to persist with the legacy system introduces the 
prospective service provider to the scenario of having to build a one-off, highly specific 
capability or asset (that will have little if any use for other clients) even as the application 
continues to have low asset specificity for the client (since it is already available and has not 
seen many changes either). 
Forming a cooperative alliance between the outsourcing firm and the service provider where 
successful attainment of program objectives requires active collaboration, builds a mutual 
dependency between the two parties which can help alleviate inter-firm opportunism 
(opportunism of some individuals though will still continue, more or less, unabated and in a 
business as usual manner) and the improved communications in such a partnership 
environment (agreement on priorities, action plans, methodologies, governance mechanisms, 
etc.) can even mitigate the bounded rationality risks once it is better understood how each 
party will behave in the face of certain actions by the other and patterns of behavior become 
19 
more predictable and definite. As both parties succeed together, solid, responsible, trusting 
behavior can come to substitute or at least better check sporadic, self-seeking, opportunistic 
behavior. 
3.4 Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage 
While the TCE and the resource based view (RBV) both further the understanding of the 
boundaries of the organization, they are different in that the focus of the former is more on 
addressing why firms exist while the focus of the latter is more on why firms differ; the 
former focuses more on governance skills while the latter focuses more on production skills 
(for example, production skills refer to the routines, processes and knowledge required to 
build valuable strategic resources)
18
. 
With its foundations in the early work of bundle of assets and resources that if employed in 
distinctive ways can create competitive advantage. 
Barney
19
 builds on the assumptions that strategic resources are heterogeneously distributed 
across firms and that these differences are stable over time and examines the link between 
firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Resources include all assets, 
capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc., 
controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve 
its efficiency and effectiveness. Possible firm resources can be classified into three 
categories: physical capital resources
20
, human capital resources
21
 and organizational capital 
resources
22
. Physical capital resources include the physical technology used in a firm, a 
firm‟s plant and equipment, its geographic location, and its access to raw materials. Human 
capital resources include training, experience, judgment, intelligence, relationships, and 
insight of individual managers and workers in a firm. Organizational capital resources 
include a firm‟s reporting structure, its formal and informal planning, controlling, and 
coordinating systems, as well as informal relations among groups within a firm and between 
a firm and those in its environment. Barney considers a firm to be having a competitive 
advantage when it is implementing a value creating strategy that is not simultaneously being 
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implemented by any current or potential competitors. A firm is said to have a sustained 
competitive advantage when it is implementing a value creating strategy not simultaneously 
being implemented by any current or potential competitors and when these other firms are 
unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy. It should be noted that sustainable 
competitive advantage does not imply that it will “last forever.” It only suggests that it will 
not be competed away through duplication of other firms. Unanticipated changes in the 
economic structure of an industry may make what was, at one time, a source of sustained 
competitive advantage, no longer valuable for a firm, and thus not a source of any 
competitive advantage. What were resources in a previous industry setting may become, over 
time, in the face of “Schumpeterian shocks” (after the name of Schumpter), weaknesses or 
simply irrelevant in a new industry setting; however, the firm that enjoyed sustained 
competitive advantage and now sees it nullified because of different circumstances will still 
be said to have had sustainable competitive advantage if it was not nullified through 
duplication. The framework often used to structure research on competitive advantage is 
depicted below: it suggests that firms obtain sustained competitive advantages by 
implementing strategies that exploit the internal strengths, through responding to 
environmental opportunities, while neutralizing external threats and avoiding internal 
weaknesses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Barney, not all firm resources hold the potential of sustained competitive 
advantage. To have this potential, a firm resource must have four attributes: 
1. It must be valuable, in the sense that it exploit opportunities and / or neutralize threats in a 
firm‟s environment, 
Figure 4:  The relationship between traditional “strengths-weaknesses-opportunities-threats” analyses, 
the resource based model, and models of industry attractiveness. (Source: Barney, 1991) 
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2. It must be rare among a firm‟s current and potential competition, 
3. It must be imperfectly imitable, and 
4. There cannot be strategically equivalent substitutes for this resource that are valuable but 
neither rare nor imperfectly imitable. 
These attributes of firm resources can be thought of as empirical indictors of how 
heterogeneous and immobile a firm‟s resources are and thus how useful these resources are 
for generating sustained competitive advantage. 
Firm resources can only be a source of competitive advantage or sustained competitive 
advantage when they are valuable. However, if a particular valuable firm resource is 
possessed by large numbers of firms, then each of these firms have the capability of 
exploiting that resource in the same way, thereby implementing a common strategy that gives 
no one firm a competitive advantage. One firm resource required in the implementation of 
almost all strategies is managerial talent. If this particular bundle of firm resources is not rare, 
then large numbers of firms will be able to conceive of and implement the strategies in 
question, and these strategies will not be a source of competitive advantage, even though the 
resources in question may be valuable. Now firms that possess valuable and rare 
organizational resources can only be sources of sustained competitive advantage if firms that 
do not possess these resources cannot obtain them, i.e., they are imperfectly imitable. Lastly, 
for a firm resource to be a source of sustained competitive advantage, there must be no 
strategically equivalent valuable resources that are themselves either not rare or imitable. 
Proponents of the RBV approach argue that it is more appropriate to explaining the existence 
of the firm than the TCE approach. Conner argues that TCE emphasized the existence of a 
firm as a means of avoiding negative opportunism, while RBV viewed the firm as a bundle of 
valuable strategic resources that can be a source of competitive advantage. 
Porter
23
 in his five forces model (figure 5) describes the attributes of an attractive industry, 
i.e., an industry that is profitable: one in which opportunities is greater and threats lesser (an 
unattractive industry is one in which a combination of forces are acting to drive down 
profitability and a very unattractive industry would be one approaching pure competition). 
Assuming that certain scope areas (e.g., strategic sourcing for certain categories of spend) 
have high asset specificity for certain outsourcing customer firms and are therefore kept out 
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of scope (being prime candidates for vertical integration), the scope mix offered to service 
providers to compete on will typically have low to medium asset specificity. The lower the 
asset specificity, the greater the pressure towards pure competition, and the lower the 
profitability or attractiveness of the industry. Service provider firms may try to differentiate 
themselves and thereby attempt to minimize rivalry among competitors. Business strategy is 
core to the direction the firm should take as it tries to woo different customers: should firms 
possessing a broad range of end to end procurement capabilities  compete with firms which 
are better known for operational expertise at low cost in general or only when operational 
scope is only a part of the overall scope? Within the industry segment / model that the service 
provider operates under, steps will need to be taken to maintain profitability by countering 
various threats. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, in order to safe guard against customer opportunism, a contract will need to be 
executed to clearly lay out service level requirements, clauses on termination fees (so that 
exit costs are equitable), etc. In order to reduce threat of new entrants, service providers will 
utilize their brand equity, patents, etc. Similarly, to ward against threat of substitutes, 
differentiated service offerings may be provided (e.g., end-to-end procurement and accounts 
payable offering compared to procurement operations alone, or cross tower capability in the 
form of a one-stop shop compared to low cost back-end operations alone, etc.). To ward off 
competitive rivalry, exit costs, improvisation, economies of scale, etc may be deployed. 
 
                              Figure 5: Graphical representation of Porter‟s five forces model 
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In terms of TCE
24
, four types of core skills which provide the following advantages: 
• Site specificity: location advantage, e.g., through locating close to raw materials or 
establishing a procurement center in a low cost country to extract lower labor rates. 
• Physical asset specificity: technology advantage, e.g. through investments in technology, 
process development or equipment. 
• Human asset specificity: know-how advantages, e.g., developed over time in terms of 
subject matter expertise about how best to procure business services for the IT industry. 
• Dedicated assets: specialized investments, e.g., a management information system for a 
client that has no alternative uses. 
A firm must defend these skills if it is to sustain its competitive advantage.  The strategic core 
skills must be redefined as market and competitive forces continuously change: skills that 
secured competitive advantage yesterday may be of no advantage in the current year. 
The core competence approach and its relationship with outsourcing have evolved from the 
RBV of the firm. Prahalad and Hamelcontend that core competencies are “the collective 
learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and 
integrate multiple streams of technologies.” Competencies are the skills, knowledge and 
technologies that an organization possesses on which its success depends. To qualify as a 
core competence, Hamel and Prahalad
25
 argue that it must have: 
• Customer value: a core competence must provide a fundamental customer benefit and make 
a contribution to customer perceived value. 
• Competitor differentiation: a core competence must be competitively unique and 
substantially superior to other competitors. 
• Extendibility: a core competence must be a gateway to tomorrow‟s markets; apart from 
being a source of customer value and providing customer differentiation, the core 
competence must be a source of creating an array of products and services into the future. 
Much of the outsourcing literature uses the core competence approach as a starting point for 
the outsourcing process. Quinn and Hilmer argue that the firm should concentrate its 
resources on a set of „core competences‟ where it can achieve definable preeminence and 
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provide unique value for customers and strategically outsource other activities for which it 
has neither a critical strategic need nor special capabilities. Venkatesan argues that the 
organization should decide what sub-systems will be indispensable to the firm‟s competitive 
position over subsequent product generations. This choice will vary from company to 
company and ultimately drive product differentiation. Considered in the context of 
outsourcing, a core activity can be considered as: 
 
• The activity is crucial in the eyes of the customer, i.e., one of the main reasons why the 
customer purchases the product or service. 
• The activity may be a source of competitive differentiation in the marketplace. 
• The organization is more competent at performing the activity than suppliers or 
competitors. 
 
      Conversely, activities that contribute little to competitive differentiation or for which the 
organization has no crucial strategic need can be defined as non-core. There is risk of 
misinterpretation here: for example, once a company has defined its core competencies, all 
other activities are described as non-core and can logically be sourced externally. This should 
not be taken to imply that supplier-provided activities are less important; it is still possible for 
outsourced activities to be of strategic significance to the organization if they are important in 
the eyes of the customer. Examples of such situations are when (1) external suppliers become 
more competent at performing the activity than the customer organization, or (2) when a 
competitor of the customer organization becomes more competent at performing the activity. 
It is crucial therefore to be sure why an activity is being outsourced; namely due to more 
capable suppliers / competitors or no longer a source of competitive differentiation. Activities 
important in the eyes of the customer and sourced externally will still continue to be of 
strategic importance.  
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3.5 Agency Theory 
 
 
During the 1960‟s and early 1970‟s, economic literature delved into risk sharing among 
individuals or groups – e.g., when co-operating parties have different attitudes toward risk. 
Agency theory
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 broadened this discussion to include the so-called agency problem that 
occurs when cooperating parties have different goals and division of labor. Agency theory is 
concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the 
agency problem that arises when the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and it 
is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. In other 
words, the principal is unable to establish firmly whether the agent has behaved 
appropriately. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and 
agent have different attitudes toward risk. The problem here is that the principal and the agent 
may prefer different actions because of the different risk preferences. 
 
Taking the contract as the unit of analysis that governs the relationship between the principal 
and the agent, the focus of the theory is on determining the most efficient contract governing 
the relationship given assumptions about people (e.g., self-interest seeking, bounded 
rationality, risk aversion), organization (e.g. goal conflict among members) and information 
(e.g., information is a commodity which can be purchased). Specifically, the question 
becomes: Is a behavior-oriented contract (e.g., salaries, hierarchical governance) more 
efficient than an outcome-oriented contract (e.g., commissions, stock options, transfer of 
property rights, market governance)? Agency theory is not only applicable to macro level 
issues (e.g., regulatory policy) but also to micro level issues (e.g. dyadic phenomena such as 
blame, impression management, lying and other expressions of self-interest). Most often, 
agency theory has been applied to organizational phenomenon such as compensation, 
acquisition and diversification strategies, ownership and financial structures, vertical 
integration and innovation.  
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See table below for a summary of agency theory: 
Table 2: Agency Theory Overview (Source: EisenhardtK., 1989) 
 
Key idea 
 
Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organization of 
information and risk-bearing costs 
  
Unit of analysis 
 
 
Contract between principal and agent 
 
 
Human assumptions 
 
 
Self-interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk aversion 
 
 
Organizational 
assumptions 
 
 
Partial goal conflict among participants 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
 
 
Information assumptions 
 
 
Information as a purchasable commodity 
 
 
Contracting problems 
 
Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
  
 
Problem domain 
 
 
Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing 
goals and risk preferences (e.g., compensation, regulation, leadership, 
impression management, whistle-blowing, vertical integration, transfer 
pricing) 
 
 
From the standpoint of procurement outsourcing, the Chief Procurement Officer or Director 
of Procurement who is responsible for evaluating and making the decision whether or not to 
outsource or what areas to potentially outsource may elicit behavior that fits within the realm 
of agency theory: e.g., managing the CEO‟s impression (tagging along based on perception of 
what the CEO wants), risk aversion (not going the logical distance for outsourcing e.g., 
deciding to explore very narrow operational scope for outsourcing rather than, potentially, a 
more encompassing end-to-end scope), blaming (e.g., exploiting effectively pent-up 
employee sentiment against outsourcing to one‟s own advantage rather than the company‟s 
larger interest – this is similar to opportunism in one‟s self-interest), etc. 
3.6 Synthesis of TCE, RBV and Agency Theory 
In Procurement Outsourcing, TCE, RBV and agency theory are all contextually relevant and 
have therefore been adopted in the development of the research model for this research on 
procurement outsourcing. 
Procurement competence (PC) comprised of its various attributes (a mix of capabilities or 
skills that are typically considered relevant for expertise in the procurement discipline) can be 
treated as the resource which if available to the firm, can drive significant value in 
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overcoming threats in the external environment (e.g., of competitors procuring goods and 
services at an advantage, whether in terms of cost, quality or other factors, and thereby 
making inroads into the firm‟s competitive position in industry) or alternatively, in leveraging 
opportunities that come up toward further consolidation of the competitive position of the 
firm (e.g., through quick launch of a new product based on an emerging new technology 
which may involve an acquisition or partnership and requires the ability to work with the 
supply base of the acquired company or business partner in a seamless manner, or better still, 
which takes the supplier relationship to an even higher level of early procurement 
involvement, etc). Nor is this relevant only in the external context – for the internal workings 
of the firm too require procurement competence to counter weaknesses (e.g., in terms of 
onerous business processes, tedious inter departmental coordination, etc.) and augment 
strengths (e.g., retention and consolidation of intellectual capital of the firm through 
generation of procurement or related patents). 
A firm may possess procurement competence or valuable resources but not utilize them 
effectively (e.g., to extract lower transaction costs) on account of various reasons – e.g., lack 
of organization, weaknesses in policy formulation and implementation, tactical versus 
strategic orientation, misplaced priorities, widespread opportunism at the department or 
business unit level and / or individual level, confusion with too many initiatives being run at 
the same time, some of which may even be at cross purposes, lack of coherent, objective 
measurements system, etc. Competitive advantage in industry can only accrue if the valuable 
resources are aligned and properly deployed and exploited to their true potential, in order for 
the firm to truly realize benefits in a controlled, assured manner. Procurement competitive 
advantage (PCA) then has to be the construct that is about realization or actualization of the 
capability or procurement competence that resides in the firm, either explicitly (quantified, 
understood vectors of skills) or implicitly (talents that reside in the firm and are relevant to 
the firm‟s position in industry but have not surfaced or been appreciated for their value thus 
far) and differentiates its procurement results from its competitors. It is different therefore 
from procurement competence (PC). 
PC that is well aligned to drive PCA today may not be well aligned to deliver similar PCA 
tomorrow; new skills may be required to operate under a different reality (e.g., managing 
relationships with suppliers in a virtual world, sourcing from other regions or countries such 
as those offering lower costs will require competence in cultural sensitivity and better attuned 
/ diverse negotiation skills, usage of new and better integrated spend analysis, bidding and 
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contracting tools, etc.). This research does not specifically delve into the longitudinal aspects 
of outsourcing. However, contextual comments are made where appropriate, including 
directions that future research could take. 
 
Intuitively, PC should be related to PCA – high PC relating to high PCA and low PC relating 
to low PCA. However, high PC can also relate to low PCA if the environment is has inherent 
“friction” (e.g., on account of factors mentioned at the beginning of the last paragraph). It 
would appear then that PC is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for PCA. Also, in the 
extreme situation where PC is really high (and expensive too, with the best category experts 
in industry available in excess of requirements), PCA will be eroded in terms of savings 
getting compromised by the sheer cost resulting from underutilization of the high PC 
procurement organization. 
 
Another construct will have to be firm competitive advantage (FCA) from procurement. PC 
should relate to PCA which in turn should relate to FCA. However, PC and PCA have to be 
seen in the context of the larger firm: even though ostensibly desirable, not necessarily will 
these three constructs be in alignment. If PCA is measured in a manner that is not consistent 
with the larger good of the firm, PCA and resulting FCA from procurement may be out of 
step. FCA as a construct will also help understand how important a contributor PC or PCA is 
to the larger firm in the context of whether or not to outsource its indirect procurement 
function. 
 
Any PO situation shall have to factor in business risk and that forms the fourth construct – 
one that imposes the ground reality of “friction” into the discussion. As firms decide whether 
or not to outsource, they must weigh their potential benefits against the risks that shall be in 
play and that they may be subjected to. Addressing elements of the risk is essential to any 
contracting process as well – doing so successfully is important to both the client firm as well 
as the service provider. 
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For each of the four constructs, i.e., PC, PCA, FCA and BR, it is relevant to understand the 
following measures for the various items or activities that together form the respective 
constructs: 
1. The relative importance ascribed to each of the items within the construct. 
2. The level of satisfaction that exists or existed before a procurement activity (or related 
support activity) was or is outsourced. 
 
Figure 6: Key factors in indirect procurement outsourcing (initial) 
3. The level of satisfaction that is or was expected from outsourcing (not applicable if 
outsourcing is not under consideration even). 
4. The level of satisfaction that is or was realized after outsourcing or prior to in-sourcing 
(not applicable if outsourcing is under consideration, was considered but decided against or is 
not even under consideration). Taken together, the model can then be shown as under (reader 
may substitute “factors” with “constructs” in figure 6):  
What should go to define each of the constructs in terms of the various dimensions and items 
within those dimensions is examined next.  
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3.7 Procurement Competence (PC) 
 
Procurement is defined as the acquisition of goods and/or services at the best possible total 
cost of ownership, in the right quantity and quality, at the right time, in the right place and 
from the right source for the direct benefit or use of corporations, or individuals, generally via 
a contract
27
. 
In terms of scope areas, the more traditional view considers procurement as encompassing 
strategic sourcing, strategy management, tactical buying and order management. In practice, 
however, it is found that additional scope areas such as accounts payable, information 
technology and procurement transformation are sometimes thrown into the scope mix on 
account of their relevance to end-to-end improvement efforts in the procurement domain. 
In order to have an appreciation of the dimensions and items included for each of the 
constructs, it is relevant to discuss these one by one. 
 
 
STRATEGIC SOURCING: The purpose of strategic sourcing is to identify and source the 
suppliers that have the potential of maximizing value to the client base. A. T. Kearney‟s 
seven-step sourcing process88 coupled with experience gained over the years indicates the 
essential components of strategic sourcing to be: 
1. Development of category profile during which a detailed understanding of spend has to be 
gained at the very outset (e.g. spend by supplier, location, users, volumes, pricing, terms and 
conditions), client need analysis conducted (e.g. to understand what is required and how well 
the requirements are presently being met or need to be met in future) and also, supplier 
market analysis conducted (e.g. to understand the ground reality of the marketplace under 
which the supplier is operating, to understand the suppliers‟ pricing structure, Porter‟s five 
forces model analysis, etc.). 
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2. Develop sourcing strategy based on an assessment of what is being sourced and where it 
fits within the category positioning matrix.  
 
Figure 7: Category Positioning Matrix (Source: Clegg and Montgomery, A. T. Kearney, 2001) 
 
For products or services that fall within the “Non-critical” or “Leverage” categories, the most 
appropriate sourcing strategies are “Volume Concentration” (combining your organization‟s 
total spend to gain leverage with the supplier) and “Best Price Evaluation” (negotiating on 
price). Global Sourcing refers to opportunities to develop new vendors and extend the 
geographic vendor base, for example through low cost country sourcing or outsourcing 
opportunities. For those that fall within the “Bottleneck” or “Strategic” categories, the most 
appropriate sourcing strategies are “Product Specification Improvement” (can the supplier 
tailor the product more specifically to your organization‟s needs?), “Joint Process 
Improvement” (can you and your supplier work together to provide better value and more 
usage?) and “Relationship Restructuring” (establish long-term partnerships with key 
suppliers in return for preferred pricing). 
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Another strategy to consider is demand management. Now that you have done your 
groundwork and are clear about your strategy, you are ready to engage the 
suppliers.
 
Figure 8: Sourcing Strategies (Source: Clegg and Montgomery, A. T. Kearney, 2001) 
 
3. Generate the supplier portfolio so that all viable suppliers are identified; need analysis 
conducted during the “develop category profile” stage helps establish the criteria for drawing 
the “long list” of suppliers. The purpose at this stage is not to restrict or discard suppliers – 
suppliers that appear unfamiliar at first glance may actually prove to be a good fit later on. 
4. Conduct request for proposal to elicit responses from suppliers identified in the previous 
step following standardized templates, decision criteria, and terms and conditions so that a 
level playing field is offered to the prospective bidders. Increasingly, electronic / internet 
tools are being adopted in preference to manual means, considerably facilitating the analysis, 
negotiation (e.g. through e-auctions) and contracting phases for quicker turnaround. 
5. Negotiate and select suppliers – starting with putting together the negotiation team 
(spokesperson, senior authority, technical expert, user, observer or “note taker) and agree on 
a negotiation strategy to be pursued. Information here is key – a thorough understanding of 
needs analysis, information contained in RFP / responses, supplier marketplace and any 
available knowledge / intelligence of the supplier‟s bargaining position. It is also essential 
that the buying firm be clear on its own bargaining position: e.g., what is the most desirable 
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outcome (MDA), the least acceptable agreement (LAA), the best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement (BATNA), what bargaining levers are available, what is the contingency plan, is it 
really true that if LAA is not reached, the buying firm is prepared to walk away? The 
negotiation stage ends once there is formal, written agreement with the supplier(s). 
6. Implement agreements with new suppliers by making the necessary changes, e.g., 
establishing and making available new catalogs, making users aware of change in suppliers 
and the offerings to be procured against them, updating rules (e.g., for tactical buying or 
order management, how charge-backs will be handled) as necessary, etc. Transition plans are 
usually recommended to ensure smooth oversight over the implementation phase. 
7. Monitor performance so that when it is time to renew the contract with the supplier (or 
make an evaluation of alternative sources of supply), there already exists a set of metrics or 
benchmarks to compare against and improve upon for the next round, in the spirit of 
continuous improvement. 
 
STRATEGY MANAGEMENT: Once suppliers with the best potential of providing benefits 
have been identified and sourced during the strategic sourcing process, strategy management 
aims to make sure that those benefits are actually realized by the client base. The main 
activities are: 1. Contract management – Routine (daily) and periodic (e.g. quarterly) tracking 
of issues and contract metrics tracking to ensure that the supplier is providing goods and 
services that meet or exceed the contractual commitments to the buyer. 2. Supply market 
monitoring – Keeping tabs on the supply market, researching and comparing against external 
benchmarks to identify areas for future improvement (e.g. in price, quality, etc.). 3. 
Evaluation and performance management – Tracking and reporting benefits, status of 
compliance management, identify need for fresh strategic sourcing, etc. 
 
TACTICAL BUYING: Not all spend can be sourced strategically and even in situations 
where strategic sources have been identified, there will always remain the requirement for ad 
hoc assistance from buyers. The main activities are: 
1. Need identification – recognizing and understanding client requirements, obtaining any 
needed additional information, confirming business objectives, etc. 
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2. Buying strategy determination – identification of potential suppliers to fulfill need, 
ensuring sourcing solution is consistent with overall sourcing strategy, determine and address 
future repetitive nature of buys, etc. 
3. Ongoing buying execution and negotiation – implementation of appropriate spot or project 
based buying strategy, define and execute negotiation strategy for ad hoc buys, 
documentation of benefits, etc. 
 
ORDER MANAGEMENT encompasses various operational, administrative, transactional 
and support activities performed for the purpose of providing clear, effective, support to 
customers and suppliers, enabling them to be better informed and more productive in their 
transactions. The main activities include: 
1. Supplier and end-user enablement support – educate and train suppliers and end users, 
establish and maintain master vendor files, coordinate with category managers on needed 
changes, etc. 
2. Content / catalog administration – establish content and format for catalogs, coordinate 
with category managers, timely updates or changes in catalogs (or other similar methods for 
automated processing). 
3. Review requisitions and place purchase orders – review incoming requisitions, route them 
to appropriate buyers, contracts or catalogs, coordinate with category managers, manage 
automated or manual order creation and placement, perform changes or alterations on 
existing purchase orders, etc. 
4. Customer and supplier assistance (help desk) – address process questions, provide status 
updates, resolve or route issues to appropriate team for resolution, provide feedback, address 
invoice related issues, etc. 
 
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE is an area that is often included in PO discussion – and refers to 
the “Pay” part of the acronyms “P2P” for Procure to Pay or “S2P” for Source to Pay. 
Accounts payable is mostly considered transactional (or operational) in nature; with the focus 
that firms have had on reducing operational expenses, it is natural that accounts payable has 
become a prime candidate for outsourcing. The fit with procurement is symbiotic: accounts 
payable cannot succeed without an effective procurement process and procurement cannot 
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succeed without an effective accounts payable process. For example, if requestors are able to 
by-pass procurement, sourcing savings will be diluted while invoices issued without purchase 
orders (called non-PO invoices) will require more labor intensive, manual processing. 
Process efficiencies are just so much better implemented and tracked if done holistically, i.e. 
from a source-to-pay or procure-to-pay perspective. The number of invoices processed per 
FTE is the productivity metric that most clients are interested in improving; open for 
discussion are measures such as negative confirmation (where the requestor is allowed a 
certain amount of time to dispute payment against an invoice and if the item is correctly 
received per requirements, no action is needed and the invoice is paid by accounts payable 
without further checking), automated invoicing (where the PO items, numbers and prices are 
matched to the invoice and if the two tally, the system allows automated payment), etc. 
 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY today is relevant to any process area, and so also is the 
case with procurement. Enabling technologies that allow seamless integration between the 
procurement, finance and accounting and human resources sub-systems are very relevant to 
firms that are considering PO. Some requests for proposal will include information 
technology and ask prospective service providers to lay out the IT vision that they consider 
optimal for the client‟s situation. Such situations can become rather complex – a client may 
have invested in disparate systems (some with lifetime licenses, including maintenance and 
training while others not so) and bundling the IT solution that is right for the client makes it 
difficult and challenging to retain the purity of and simplicity of just the procurement process. 
IT is certainly important for the client and service providers to be able to differentiate 
themselves in the eyes of the clients by their ability to manage the deployment, integration 
and enhancement of the source to pay (or procure to pay) platform, as a one-stop-shop 
provider. Application maintenance services, e-business hosting, etc., are other areas that are 
also similarly relevant to the PO discussion. 
 
3.8 Procurement Competitive Advantage (PCA)  
The value proposition from PO has to be understood in the context of the competitive 
advantage it helps solidify for the firm. The typical range of savings from PO is 10 to 15 
percent from operating efficiency, 25 to 50 percent from compliance and 40 to 60 percent 
from strategic sourcing. It is possible then to treat each of the impact areas as separate 
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dimensions of PCA. Utilizing insights from Everest coupled with practical experience in PO 
gained over the years, the dimensions and items are explained below in figure.  
 
Figure 9: Value Proposition for Procurement Outsourcing (Everest) 
                    (Source: Everest Research Institute, 2007) 
 
IMPACT ON OPERATIONAL COSTS: Compared to other towers such as Finance and 
Accounting, Customer Relationship Management and Human Resource Management where 
operational savings can be extracted, especially through off-shoring, PO does not readily lend 
itself for similar savings. Procurement resources overall are expensive, especially those 
performing strategic sourcing and strategy management roles. In many cases, the client may 
only be looking to outsource a portion of their procurement function. 
Procure-to-pay (P2P) contains more of the transactional / administrative workload that is 
often a good candidate for cost reduction (off-shoring can be part of the solution here) 
compared to the entire source-to-pay (S2P) scope (where a significant proportion of resources 
need to remain in high cost host country) where it is important to maintain rapport / 
relationship with on-site presence at client site or with key suppliers. 
1. Procurement labor cost reduction – An organization that spends Tk 1 Crore per year may 
want to reduce the cost to a lower level and have that as an objective for PO. In some cases, 
labor cost may actually go up if the procurement team is not skilled and / or staffed at 
appropriate levels – in such situations too, a determination may be made that the right 
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procurement organization would cost (say) Tk 2 Crore per year and if PO allows the same to 
be done for less, it can be considered labor cost reduction for business case purposes, going 
forward. In some situations, employees spread within the larger organization (e.g., secretaries 
or office assistants) may be performing procurement related tasks that will fall within the 
ambit of the procurement organization in an outsourced environment (e.g. assistance with 
placing requisitions) – even though the labor cost for procurement goes up, overall, the cost 
comes down for the firm on account of the greater efficiency with which procurement staff 
can assist and perform procurement related tasks. 
2. Employee productivity – Having catalogs, more streamlined requisitioning processes, 
readily available central help desk, etc., helps improve employee productivity. In reality, 
service providers find it challenging to include employee productivity benefits in the business 
case – client firms are hesitant to acknowledge these. In some situations productivity 
improvement may be acknowledged but not in a manner that truly reduces employee costs – 
e.g., FTE‟s need to be whole numbers and fractional reductions are considered 
inconsequential by business units. 
 
IMPACT ON COMPLIANCE AND END USERS:  Enabling end users to procure more 
effectively helps the firm serve clients better which in turn helps generate greater revenue for 
the firm. Compliance allows potential benefits that have been identified to be actually 
realized. 
1. Reduced maverick (or by-pass or rogue Spend – Firms that have mature and fully 
functional procurement organizations have maverick spend (i.e. spend committed without 
Procurement involvement) of the order of one to two percent of total spend. PO clients often 
are immature in this regard with a majority of their Spend as by-pass and they look to PO to 
help change the situation. 
2. Service levels – For end users, it is important that PO maintain or improve service levels in 
terms of various metrics such as cycle time, on-time deliveries, timely resolution of issues, 
etc. as defined in the contract. 
3. Adherence to purchase policies and procedures – An audit of procurement may reveal that 
even though by-pass Spend is ostensibly meager, there are deficiencies in the manner in 
which it is being measured. It is important that compliance exists not just in letter but also in 
spirit. 
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IMPACT ON OVERALL BUSINESS: If end-users are compliant and procurement is 
operationally efficient, it should be possible to extract the full potential of benefits that 
procurement has to offer in order to impact the bottom line. 
1. Enterprise-wide spend visibility – Apart from being a needed step for building the category 
profile during strategic sourcing, spend visibility allows business units / divisions to gain a 
clearer understanding of the various areas where money is being spent. Depending on the 
client situation, the means adopted can be manual or IT-tools based. 
2. Spend aggregation and leverage – The ability to aggregate category wise spend across 
business units and geographies brings into play a different dynamic in supplier selection and 
power positioning. 
3. Improved sourcing savings – In some situations, various business units in a firm may have 
had separate contracts with the same supplier with limited overall leverage. The same 
supplier may be prepared to offer to corporate procurement the same goods or services at a 
discounted price (say 90 percent of previous price). As spend compliance improves, the 
consolidation may become even stronger, with the possibility of still better savings (e.g., 
rebates which are contingent upon the volume of spend offered and typically increase as a 
step function, the higher the spend, the greater the rate at which the rebate is offered). 
4. Improved supplier relationships – As suppliers are sourced strategically, there is greater 
focus on managing the relationship well to the mutual benefit of both parties: an open, 
proactive, trusting relationship ensues between supplier and buyer firms. The supplier will try 
to bring in new ways of providing value to the customer base and the buying firm will try to 
empathize with the supplier‟s situation to understand what is reasonable and what is not. 
5. Reduction of existing supply base – Typically, in tandem with routing more business to the 
few strategic suppliers, a significant number of non-strategic suppliers that may have 
burgeoned over the years are removed or “blocked” for business. Having to manage fewer 
contracts allows the procurement organization to become more effective at lower operational 
cost. 
6. Ability to drive business unit budget reductions from savings – In order for procurement 
savings to have a sustainable impact, downward budgetary adjustments are needed year on 
year. The CEO would naturally be interested in managing more for less whereas the business 
units may want to keep their budgetary allocations mostly intact. In a complex environment, 
it is essential to have a good governance mechanism that involves various stakeholders 
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(including business unit representatives) so that savings projects are prioritized jointly 
through a team charter approach and benefits realized are mutually agreed to by procurement, 
finance and business units working together. This is an important area for PO to provide 
value since earlier attempts by client firm may not have been successful enough in breaking 
the logjam. 
7. Applying outsourcing lessons learned to avoid repeating mistakes – As in life, it is always 
better to learn from others‟ mistakes; PO service providers and third party advising (TPA) 
firms allow clients to circumvent derailing factors to procurement effectiveness. 
8. Ability of procurement team to focus better on key areas – As procurement is executed 
with an increasingly strategic focus / mission, the entire procurement organization gets 
permeated with a culture that makes sure that the key priority areas get undiverted attention.  
 
3.9 Firm Competitive Advantage (FCA) 
“Outsourcing strategically for sustainable competitive advantage”28 mentions various goals 
that firms can seek to achieve through PO that are relevant to the internal or external 
orientation of the firm. In terms of the ability to better exploit the external environment or 
opportunities through PO, to the benefit of the firm at large, the following items are relevant: 
1. Ability to focus better on core competencies – As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
Venkatesan as well as Quinn and Hilmer have argued for outsourcing activities that a firm 
has neither a critical need for nor special capabilities in and focusing its resources (including 
procurement expertise) on a set of core competences where it can achieve preeminence and 
provide unique value to its customers. 
2. Ability to improve market positioning – In terms of Porter‟s five forces model (refer figure 
below), each business unit or process area contributes to how the company is competitively 
positioned within the industry that it operates under. To the extent that procurement is able to 
leverage and negotiate with suppliers and requestors for better prices and terms and 
conditions on behalf of the business unit or process area, its role increases the opportunity for 
serving clients with greater value-add, thereby making it possible to enhance the firm‟s 
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relative position versus its rivals.  
 
Figure 10: The Five Competitive Forces that Determine Industry Profitability 
                                                     (Source: Porter, 1998) 
3. Ability to improve market share for product or service – the percentage of total market 
(sum of sales revenue available with the firm divided by total overall sales revenue available 
in that market) that is being catered is always an important metric and the fruits of better 
market positioning will result in consolidation of share in the desired segments. It may be 
noted that the focus of the previous point is on building and sustaining competitive advantage 
(now and in future) whereas the present focuses on market share on a more immediate basis 
(now – e.g., by quarter).  
4. Ability to enter new or emerging markets – the past decade has seen increased economic 
growth in developing countries such as Bangladesh and a relative slow-down in most of the 
developed world. Many firms desirous of sustaining growth are therefore forced to look at 
emerging countries – some choose captive outsourcing (where outsourcing is done internally 
within the firm) as one of the options for making an entry while others opt to go with a 
service provider who may have operations to provide off-shore delivery content. In the latter 
case, the firm will gain initial experience during the contract duration (e.g., culture, quality of 
delivery, etc.) and when it comes time to renew the contract, decide to operate on its own. (It 
41 
is also possible that a firm wanting to set up operations and not able to build procurement 
expertise, may choose to outsource it domestically to another firm).  
5. Ability to rapidly acquire or divest for growth – The last decade saw significant merger 
and acquisition and divestiture activity, and procurement expertise is challenged on each 
occasion as the supply bases are aligned, greater leverage exercised, contracts renegotiated, 
etc. In an effort to cope, the more experienced procurement team may be utilized for priority 
areas leaving some of the non-core areas to be outsourced. On other occasions, procurement 
skills in a certain country may be very rudimentary and PO may offer the faster route to 
source required expertise. 
6. Ability to follow outsourcing trend; not be left behind rivals – If most of a firm‟s 
competitors are outsourcing, it may be actually be a risky strategy to not simply follow the 
trend. Many firms look to outsourcing to quickly build procurement expertise which it did not 
previously possess in-house in right measure while others look to outsourcing as a means to 
off-load areas that are not considered a priority.   
3.10 Business Risk (BR) 
In chapter 2, TCE was discussed and the concepts of uncertainty, opportunism, bounded 
rationality, information asymmetry and frequency were presented in terms of the impact they 
have on transaction costs and organizational structure. To the extent these are at play, a firm 
will experience business risk. Whether or not a firm actually outsources, business risk is a 
given – the question is whether the risk increases or decreases consequent to outsourcing, 
compared to prior to outsourcing. UNCERTAINTY refers to difficulty in foreseeing the 
eventualities that may occur during the course of the transaction. One factor is the length of 
the transaction itself: transactions that take place on “spot markets” have relatively little 
uncertainly since one does not have to predict the future. On the other hand, transactions that 
require a longer term commitment have inherent uncertainty built into them. Outsourcing 
contracts can typically last one to five years – long enough to introduce uncertainty from the 
standpoint of both the client firm as well as the service provider. The following items are 
considered important for curbing uncertainty:  
1. Scope of work to be performed needs to be well defined in the contract (e.g. number of 
transactions, spend by category, number of users, locations, systems, countries requiring 
coverage, languages to be catered by the help desk, etc.).  
42 
2. Service levels to measure against need to be well defined in the contract so that 
performance is at standards considered acceptable (e.g., cycle time for purchase orders, 
percent savings by category, automated percentage for purchase orders and invoices, average 
response time for customer assistance center calls, etc.).  
3. Governance model needs to be clearly defined so that the relationship between 
stakeholders operates along desired lines, with regular reviews, issue resolution plans, joint 
target setting, etc., so that the prospects of assured benefits realization are maximized on a 
consistent basis.  
4. Contractual requirements in terms of various other areas need to be clearly stated in the 
contract – e.g. treatment of in-flight projects, displaced resources and costs, termination 
provisions, amendments or additions / deletions to performance indicators, manner of 
computing service levels credits and debits, economic inflation, treatment of delays in 
transition / transformation timeline (including impact from opportunity cost standpoint), 
indemnity / limitations of liability clauses, intellectual property rights, disengagement 
assistance, etc. 
OPPORTUNISM refers to the possibility that people (or at least some people) will act in a 
self-interested way “with guile” (which goes beyond just self-interested behavior, which is 
considered normal), that is, people may not be entirely honest and truthful about their 
intentions, or they might attempt to take advantage of unforeseen circumstances that gives 
them the chance to exploit their situation versus another party or parties. The following items 
are considered relevant:  
1. Interactions between players are trustworthy – the stakeholders need to be able to trust 
each other; open, proactive interactions are important to secure joint success.  
2. Reward (or penalty) for over (or under) achievement is equitable – stakeholders should be 
motivated to overachieve so that they can share the rewards. On the flip side, they should also 
have to share the burden in case of underperformance.  
3. Entry (or exit) cost for starting (or ending) the relationship should be fair to the 
stakeholders. Satisfactory arrangements covering various scenarios and mitigating risk should 
be included in the contract. 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY refers to our inability to process or remember all the 
information at our disposal or accurately work out the consequences of the information that 
we possess. The following items are considered relevant:  
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1. Ease of grasping information fully on account of individual limitations or environmental 
complexity – to the extent processes, methodologies, etc., are clearly defined and understood 
by the stakeholders and complexity reduction is pursued as the objective, business risk can be 
mitigated. As an example, this requires that the savings methodology be documented and 
well explained through illustration.  
2. Tendency to make quick, rule of thumb decisions rather than painstaking, optimal 
decisions – writing down the objective function and the various constraints and then 
optimizing the solution is rarely practiced.  
3. Tendency to cooperate with wrong priorities or players – factors such as goodwill, group 
or peer pressure, etc. may influence a player even though they should not. As an example, a 
buyer may be somewhat lenient (and short-sighted) and not report a procurement by-pass 
arising in a business unit that he was originally hired into (at time of joining the firm) and still 
has happy memories of, in the belief that reporting such a by-pass may get that business unit 
into trouble.  
 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY refers to situations where one party has more or better 
information than the other.  
 
SMALL NUMBERS (or low frequency) refers to transactions that are seldom performed – 
they do not benefit from scale or synergy effects in the same manner as more frequent 
transactions do. The items considered are:  
1. A few transactions have very high costs – A 10 lacs requisition for which a purchase order 
needs to be placed quickly by sourcing the supplier tactically, may end up costing twenty 
times an average tactical buy. Such requests, although small in numbers, can skew the 
average costs significantly.  
2. Frequency of few high cost items varies widely – Coupled with the high cost of processing 
certain types of transactions, their erratic frequency can further compound the business risk.   
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3.11 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES  
This section presents the research questions and hypotheses to further our understanding of 
indirect PO. The basic research question on which the study is based is: What are the key 
differentiators and differences in indirect PO between firms by OS Status, i.e., CDA, IS, 
NUC, OS and UC? Based on the model shown in the figure 6, the research questions are 
extended to include all possibilities:  
1. What are the key factors in indirect procurement outsourcing? What differentiating 
comparisons can be made BETWEEN each of the five indirect PO situations (i.e., OS Status), 
with regard to the key factors for outsourcing in terms of the following (Q. 1, 2, 3, 4 of 
Survey Questionnaire): a. Satisfaction or risk levels that exist „before‟ or without outsourcing. 
b. Increase or decrease in satisfaction or risk level „expected‟ from outsourcing compared to 
„before‟ or without outsourcing (not applicable for NUC). c. Increase or decrease in 
satisfaction or risk level „after‟ outsourcing compared to „expected‟ from outsourcing 
(applicable only to IS and OS). 
2. What differentiating comparison can be made WITHIN each of the five indirect PO 
situations (i.e., OS Status), with regard to the key factors for outsourcing in terms of the 
following (Q. 1, 2, 3, 4 of Survey Questionnaire): a. Increase or decrease in satisfaction or 
risk level „expected‟ from outsourcing compared to „before‟ or without outsourcing (not 
applicable for NUC). b. Increase or decrease in satisfaction or risk level „after‟ outsourcing 
compared to „expected‟ from outsourcing (applicable only to IS and OS).  
3. Are there significant differences BETWEEN different OS Status types in terms of the 
extent to which they view procurement as important to the firm? (Q. 11 A, B, C of Survey 
Questionnaire) 
4. Are there significant differences BETWEEN OS Status types IS and OS in terms of the 
extent of collaboration with the service provider? (Q. 12 A, B, C of Survey Questionnaire)  
5. Are there significant differences BETWEEN OS Status types in terms of the extent to 
which they view outsourcing as capable of increasing savings, reducing costs or improving 
compliance? (Q. 13. A, B, C of Survey Questionnaire)  
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6. Are there significant differences BETWEEN OS Status types in terms of the extent to 
which they view loss of control from outsourcing core or non core activities to be 
unacceptable or acceptable? (Q. 14. A, B of Survey Questionnaire)  
7. What are some of the key demographic or other differences for firms that have not 
considered outsourcing?  The hypotheses for research questions 1–6 are summarized in table 
3 below; research question 7 is addressed in Chapter 5 on Data Analysis and Results when 
evidence related to it is presented, but not in a manner to discuss any hypotheses around it. 
 
Table 3: List of research hypotheses to be tested 
 
 
RESEARCH 
QUESTION # 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
 HYPOTHESIS 1A 
 
 
 
 
1, a 
 
1AA0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) BEFORE or WITHOUT outsourcing is EQUAL, 
BETWEEN all the different OS Status types 
 1AA1: Alternative 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT) BEFORE or WITHOUT outsourcing is NOT EQUAL, 
BETWEEN all the different OS Status types 
  
 HYPOTHESIS 1B 
 
 
 
 
1, b 
 
1BA0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) EXPECTED from outsourcing MINUS BEFORE 
outsourcing is EQUAL, BETWEEN all the different OS Status types 
 1BA1: Alternative 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) EXPECTED from outsourcing MINUS BEFORE 
outsourcing is NOT EQUAL, BETWEEN all the different OS Status types 
   
 HYPOTHESIS 1C 
 
 
 
 
1, c 
 
1CA0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) AFTER outsourcing MINUS EXPECTED from 
outsourcing is EQUAL, BETWEEN all the different OS Status types 
 1CA1: Alternative 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) AFTER outsourcing MINUS EXPECTED from 
outsourcing is NOT EQUAL, BETWEEN all the different OS Status types 
   
 HYPOTHESIS 2A 
 
 
 
 
 
2, a 
 
 
2AA0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) EXPECTED from outsourcing MINUS BEFORE 
outsourcing is EQUAL TO ZERO, WITHIN each of the OS Status types (all 
except NUC) 
 
 
2AA1: Alternative 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) EXPECTED from outsourcing MINUS BEFORE 
outsourcing is GREATER THAN ZERO, WITHIN each of the OS Status types 
(all except NUC) 
    
 HYPOTHESIS 2B 
 
 
 
 
2, b 
 
2BA0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) AFTER outsourcing MINUS EXPECTED from 
outsourcing is EQUAL TO ZERO, WITHIN OS Status types IS and OS 
 2BA1: Alternative 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) AFTER outsourcing MINUS EXPECTED from 
outsourcing is LESS THAN ZERO, WITHIN OS Status types IS and OS 
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RESEARCH 
QUESTION # 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
 HYPOTHESIS 3 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
3A0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which different OS Status types view PROCUREMENT 
AS IMPORTANT to the firm is EQUAL 
 3A1: Alternate 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which different OS Status types view PROCUREMENT 
AS IMPORTANT to the firm is NOT EQUAL 
   
 HYPOTHESIS 4 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
4A0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which Client firms with Status IS or OS COLLABORATE 
EFFECTIVELY with the SERVICE PROVIDER is EQUAL 
 4A1: Alternate 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which Client firms with Status IS or OS COLLABORATE 
EFFECTIVELY with the SERVICE PROVIDER is NOT EQUAL 
   
 HYPOTHESIS 5 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
5A0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which different OS Status types view BENEFITS AS 
ACCRUING FROM OUTSOURCING is EQUAL 
 5A1: Alternate 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which different OS Status types view BENEFITS AS 
ACCRUING FROM OUTSOURCING is NOT EQUAL 
  
 HYPOTHESIS 6 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
6A0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which different OS Status types view LOSS OF 
CONTROL from outsourcing CORE OR NON CORE activities to be 
unacceptable or acceptable (respectively) is EQUAL 
 
 
6A1: Alternate 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which different OS Status types view LOSS OF 
CONTROL from outsourcing CORE OR NON CORE activities to be 
unacceptable or acceptable (respectively) is NOT EQUAL 
  
The hypotheses shall be tested in the Data Analysis chapter based on the methodology 
presented in the Methodology chapter, which follows next. 
 
3.12 Summary  
In this chapter, the various relevant theories of transactional cost economics, the resource 
based view and the agency theory were reviewed. These were then synthesized to lay the 
foundation for establishing the research model. The constructs of procurement competence, 
procurement competitive advantage, firm competitive advantage and business risk were 
developed for the research model, with a detailed commentary into what should comprise 
each construct. The research questions and the research hypotheses that need to be tested to 
answer those questions were presented next. The methodology that shall be applied for the 
data analysis and hypothesis testing is the subject of the next chapter.     
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the methods of data collection and data analysis that were deployed in 
order to test the various hypotheses mentioned in the previous chapter. Data were collected 
through use of the survey instrument; there is discussion on sample size, sampling procedures 
and the survey implementation. In data analysis, it is explained how measures were tested for 
validity and reliability and the manner in which the hypotheses testing was conducted.   
4.2 Data Collection and Study Population  \ 
 
A determination was made that the survey instrument would be the appropriate means for 
collecting data required to conduct this research on indirect PO.  In addition to reaching out 
to respondents in firms that have outsourced their indirect procurement, the mailing list of the 
survey recipients also included procurement professionals from firms that have not 
outsourced their indirect PO, i.e., from firms that considered but decided against (CDA), 
firms that had outsourced but later decided to insource (IS), firms that do not have it under 
consideration (NUC), or firms that are presently having it under consideration (UC).  
4.3 Sampling Procedure  
Sectors were carefully chosen taking into account the existing Bangladesh based firms to 
represent the survey data. Industries that have a common tradition of procurement 
outsourcing were given preference.  
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Table 4: Mailing Size by different sectors 
 
To give a flavor of some of the clients, present or prospective, the following list (for 
illustrative purposes only) is provided (the names of firms mentioned, unless otherwise 
already known in the public domain, are not intended to bear any reflection whatsoever on 
whether the firm has already outsourced (OS), is considering outsourcing (UC for under 
consideration), has considered but decided against (CDA), outsourced but decided to in-
source (IS) or has not considered outsourcing (NUC for not under consideration); the names 
are provided purely for illustrative purposes):  
• Garments Industries: e.g. SAAD MUSA , ALLTEX.  
•Food products: e.g. Rahima Food, APEX Foods. 
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION 
MAILING 
SIZEREQUESTED 
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION 
MAILING 
SIZEREQUESTED 
Garments Industries 30 Communication and related Firms 30 
Food products 10 Developer and Construction Firms 30 
Paper and allied products 15 Wholesale trade – durable goods 15 
Printing and publishing 15 
Wholesale trade – nondurable 
goods 
15 
Chemicals and allied 
products 
45 Miscellaneous retail 10 
Wooden Furniture and allied 
Products 
15 Banking 30 
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products 
15 Insurance Companies 30 
Hotel and Accommodation 
Service 
30 Educational Institutes 30 
Electric/electronic equipment 
and Service 
45 Health services 30 
Life Insurance Companies 30 Engineering related services 15 
Instruments and related 
products 
15 TOTAL                                  = 500 
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•Paper and allied products: e.g. Hakkani Pulp And Paper. 
•Printing and publishing: e.g. KPPL. •Chemicals and allied products: e.g. BeximcoPharma. 
•Wooden Furniture and allied Products: e.g. Brothers Furniture. 
•Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products: e.g. RFL.  
•Hotel and Accommodation Service: e.g. The Pavillion. 
•Electric/electronic equipment and Service: e.g. RahimAfrooz 
•Life Insurance Companies: e.g. Sandhani Life Insurance 
•Instruments and related products: e.g. Goldenson Ltd. 
•Communication and related Firms: e.g. PBL. 
•Developer and Construction Firms: e.g. EPIC Properties Ltd, CPDL. 
•Wholesale trade – durable goods: e.g. 
•Wholesale trade – nondurable goods: e.g.  
•Miscellaneous retail: e.g. AGORA. 
•Banking: e.g. CITY Bank Ltd. 
• Insurance Companies: e.g. Pioneer Insurance 
•EducationalInstitutes: e.g. AIUB. 
•Health services: e.g. Metropolitan Hospital 
•Engineeringrelated services: e.g. AK Engineering  
 
 
Responses sought were not only from firms that had already outsourced (OS) (including 
those that later in-sourced i.e. IS) but also, firms that were considering outsourcing (UC) or 
had considered and decided against (CDA) and firms that did not have indirect PO under 
consideration (NUC).  The valid responses received are as follows:  
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Outsourced 52 
Outsourced but later in-
sourced 
8 
Under consideration 18 
Considered but decided against 16 
Not under consideration 103 
Total 197 
 
4.4 Survey Instrument   
 
The survey instrument (Appendix A) is eight pages long: it contains a cover page, a page of 
instructions, three pages containing questions pertaining to the main constructs for the study, 
two pages containing general questions on spend, number of transactions, etc., and also a few 
questions to obtain additional information to ascertain importance ascribed to procurement. 
The last page is on demographic information. the items were painstakingly generated to 
ensure that the right content for the purpose  of the study was reflected in the question set.   
The questionnaire was pretested with 14 individuals capable of providing a rounded  
perspective essential to the validation: one from academics (faculty / researcher), two service  
provider managers (with a good grasp over policy and organizational issues), three 
professionals (with an understanding of procurement and related support activities) and three 
client firm representatives (with knowledge of actual issues involving outsourcing). The 
offered suggestions were incorporated to improve the content and clarity of the instrument. 
The survey intended to measure respondent perception and attitude towards indirect PO for 
the five OS situations (CDA, IS, NUC, OS, UC) and this was clearly stated up front in the 
instructions (as well as the cover letter). The respondents were also told that they were to 
“think of ANY indirect procurement related activity, including ANY support activity (e.g., 
procurement help desk, deployment of procurement IT platform or maintenance) that is 
relevant to the outsourcing (OS) discussion for your firm and provide your answers with that 
activity or set of such activities as a reference point.” On the key constructs, it was considered 
important to obtain feedback in terms of (1) satisfaction (or risk) levels prevalent before 
outsourcing, (2) satisfaction (or risk) levels that were expected from outsourcing, and (3) 
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actual satisfaction (or risk) levels experienced after outsourcing. While it is true and can be 
argued that opinions change over time (e.g., a respondent may have had a satisfaction of 2 on 
a five point scale before outsourcing and now, two years later, having actually experienced 
PO may feel that the satisfaction before outsourcing was a 3 and not a 2, it is also true that 
what matters in the end, i.e., at the present time, is the respondent‟s belief of what the 
satisfaction level was prior to outsourcing (compared to „expected‟ or „after‟ outsourcing). 
Laying out the satisfaction (or risk) options (i.e., „before,‟ „expected,‟ and, „after,‟) while 
ensuring utmost economy (length of survey and time taken to complete) drove the decision 
on the layout adopted (Appendix A). This was also partly dictated by the need to present the 
items in a sequence that mirrored some of the known process or key steps within each of the 
constructs. Presenting items separately to cover the time dimension („before,‟ „expected,‟ 
and, „after) could have resulted in inconsistent responses, caused annoyance to the 
respondents (who would have had to flip pages to compare their „after‟ responses with 
„expected‟ or „before‟) and threatened the response rate. In the present format, the respondent 
makes a „forced choice‟ in assessing the scenarios of „before,‟ „expected,‟ and, „after‟ (all laid 
out on the same row), thereby allowing for more deliberate, comparative responses. It should 
be mentioned that review of available procurement and outsourcing measures revealed that 
they would have limited applicability for the present study. Accordingly, separate items that 
specifically addressed each process and scope area were developed, consistent with what is 
widely understood from literature on the subject as well as knowledge of the practice. As an 
example, none of the studies have attempted gauging client perception of their procurement 
competence „before‟, „expected,‟ or „after‟ outsourcing. Accordingly, it was necessary to first 
incorporate the various facets of procurement competence into a single construct (later 
divided into two based on factor analysis) and present all the items to the respondent to 
clearly provide the comparative responses. The items included did glean and incorporate 
inputs known to be relevant.  
The number of items under each construct, apart from representing a generic set of items 
(representing process areas, key parameters, etc.) that are encompassing enough to capture 
the range of the concept is somewhat deliberately kept at the levels seen in the survey 
questionnaire.   
 
It can be seen that the number of items within the PCA construct are: two items on 
operational aspects (out of total 13), three items on compliance and end users and the balance 
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on the overall business (sourcing related but also related to other areas covered under the 
Competence section where IT, change management etc., are also included). Similarly, for the 
PC construct, the number of items reflects a level of weight that is commonly known in 
practice to be attributable to each dimensional area: e.g., order management costs less than 
strategic sourcing; when the overall score for the construct is arrived at, procurement 
competence has to be a reflection of cost (as an example) as well. In short, the number of 
items within each dimension or construct reflects a level of thought and rigor that has gone 
into the design of the questionnaire. The „general‟ items in the questionnaire sought to obtain 
information on spend and transaction volumes, extent to which the firm considered 
procurement as important, the collaborative (or lack thereof) nature of the relationship with 
the service provider, respondents‟ view of extent of benefits that outsourcing has to offer, risk 
of loss of control to the core or none core areas of the procurement function, etc. A question 
on industry sector aims to understand whether some sectors are more prone to outsourcing 
than some others (within the sectors already chosen per the sampling procedure explained 
earlier).   
 
4.5 Data Analysis   
 
The data analysis was conducted following the approach of conducting item analysis to 
ensure consistency to identify the key factors that explain the variance, testing for reliability, 
and construct validity. These are explained in the data analysis chapter in greater detail. 
Factor analysis was conducted using satisfaction „before‟ scores on various items as the 
variables (see Appendix B for the list of variables and their descriptions). Once the constructs 
were identified / validated, the focus of the analysis shifted to comparison of the means 
between various outsourcing scenarios termed OS Status types in this narrative (i.e. CDA, IS, 
NUC, OS and UC).  
In the comparison of the means, analysis was done at both the overall construct level and at 
the item / dimension level across OS Status types. Since each construct has multiple items, 
the average score on each comes close to the continuous distribution assumption needed to 
conduct analysis of variance. Pair wise comparisons (such as between IS and OS, which 
alone have both the „after‟ and „expected‟ scores), were done using the two sample t-test. 
Comparisons within each OS Status type (e.g. „expected ‟compared to „before‟ for within IS 
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alone) were done using paired t-tests since the independence assumption is not as strong as 
for other comparisons. (In effect, analysis of variance to compare OS Status type 
combinations extends the two-sample t-test for testing the equality of two population means 
to a more general null hypothesis of comparing the equality of more than two means, versus 
them not all being equal). 
Normality was tested using Anderson-Darling‟s test and it was found that wherever the 
distribution was not normal, the difference in the median values using the Kruskal - 
Wallistest (a non-parametric test) was at p-levels higher than p-levels achieved for Tukey‟s 
family wise comparisons. In other words, Tukey (at 90 percent simultaneous confidence 
level) was the most conservative (comparisons were also done using Fisher‟s method at95 
percent individual confidence level but Tukey was more conservative in rejecting the null 
hypotheses). The comparison between OS Status types as an aggregate of the comparisons at 
each item level, provides powerful evidence not only of the significant inequality of the 
means, but also, the pervasiveness of the inequality. After all, as data points increase, even 
small differences can appear significant; the aggregation approach of providing a score on 
what percentage of items rejected the null hypothesis, individually, provides a way of 
comparing support for a broad based difference in the means, across the various items within 
the construct for different OS types. The comparison of the means requires an assumption 
that the variance is equal or nearly equal and for this the Levine test was performed and the 
examples are provided in the next chapter.  
A level of creativity was needed in managing with limitations in the number of responses. 
The 52 responses received from respondents representing firms that have outsourced (OS) 
and eight representing firms that have in-sourced (IS), together represented a very high 
response rate from among those that could be targeted as representative of these groups. This 
is explained in the next chapter under the heading, “Sample Description.” CDA and UC 
responses were somewhat lower than expected – one would have thought that with all the 
literature indicating the ushering in of the „rapid growth‟ phase, many more would have 
outsourcing under consideration or already considered but decided against. This may indicate 
that outsourcing is not as prevalent or popular as an agenda, when seen from the point of 
view of industry as a whole, not just the large firms (which have received most attention in 
available studies conducted by consulting firms).  
In any case, with the number of responses received, and without reducing the number of 
variables or items which really capture the full breadth of the constructs within the study, it 
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was necessary to make do with the approach adopted in this research. Once factor analysis 
revealed the constructs based on satisfaction „before‟ scores („before scores had the 
maximum number of data points since all OS types could respond to them), other 
comparisons were built with that as the reference point: „expected‟ minus „before‟ brought 
into focus the responses from all OS types except NUC and „after‟ minus „expected‟ 
concentrated on just IS and OS.  
Comparison of the means provides powerful information about the state of indirect 
procurement outsourcing. Differences in the predictor variables (i.e., constructs) help shed 
light on the characteristics that are witnessed for each of the OS types. This is discussed in 
Chapter 6.  
 
4.6 Summary   
 
This chapter described the data collection and study population. A total of roughly 500 
respondents were picked for receiving the mail survey questionnaires from a set of members 
of a professional association known to have been more inclined to indirect procurement 
outsourcing. The sampling procedure and data sample are discussed and the contents of the 
survey questionnaire highlighted. The manner in which the data analysis is conducted (in the 
next chapter) is summarized.                                  
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, analysis of data for indirect procurement outsourcing, collected through the 
survey instrument, will be documented. To begin with, the sample is described in terms of the 
characteristics of the respondents. This is followed by testing for non-response bias. Next, 
items, dimensions and constructs are validated using item analysis and factor analysis. Lastly, 
various combinations of means are compared to identify significant differences that go to 
prove or disprove the hypothesis laid out in the previous chapter.   
5.2 Sample Description  
 
Details on the manner in which the data was collected were provided in the previous chapter. 
Against a total of 500 mailings (each mailing included the cover letter, survey questionnaire), 
197 valid responses were received:   
 
                          Table 5 :Total number of responses received 
Outsourced(OS) 52 
Outsourced but later in-
sourced(IS) 
8 
Under consideration(UC) 18 
Considered but decided 
against(CDA) 
16 
Not under consideration(NUC) 103 
Total 197 
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The respondents covered a range of work experience with their current employer as 
summarized in the table below. Approximately 40 percent of the respondents had less than 
five years of experience with the current firm and 76 percent had less than ten years of work 
experience with the current firm. Across various OS Status types too, the preponderance of 
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION 
MAILING 
SIZEREQUESTED 
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION 
MAILING 
SIZEREQUESTED 
Garments Industries 15 Communication and related Firms 8 
Food products 2 Developer and Construction Firms 10 
Paper and allied products 7 Wholesale trade – durable goods 6 
Printing and publishing 3 
Wholesale trade – nondurable 
goods 
4 
Chemicals and allied products 17 Miscellaneous retail 6 
Wooden Furniture and allied 
Products 
2 Banking 11 
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastic products 
3 Insurance Companies 13 
Hotel and Accommodation 
Service 
10 Educational Institutes 3 
Electric/electronic equipment 
and Service 
10 Health services 10 
Life Insurance Companies 13 Engineering related services 10 
Instruments and related 
products 
12 Others 22 
TOTAL                                  = 197 
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respondents fell within the category of less than ten years of experience with their current 
firm.  
 
  Table 6: Respondent‟s Number of Years of Experience 
 
OSSTATUS <5yrs 5–10yrs 10–15yrs 15–20yrs >20yrs Total 
  
CDA 5 6 4 1 16 
 
IS 2 2 2 2 8 
 
NUC 41 27 11 5 19 103 
 
OS 21 11 7 5 8 52 
 
UC 9 5 1 2 1 18 
 
Total 78 51 25 15 28 197 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the 52 OS responses, 13 had outsourced within the past one year, 15 for over a year but 
less than 2 years, 6 for more than 2 years but less than 3 years and the remaining 18 for over 
3 years. In terms of the contract duration, 21 had outsourced for 3 years, 21 for more than 3 
but less than 5 years, 3 for more than 5 years but less than 7 years; 7 did not provide the 
duration of the contract. 
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Table 7: Annual spend by respondent‟s firm 
 
 
 
OS STATUS Less than10 lac Tk 10lac-1 cr           Tk 1-10 Crore         OverTk 10 Cr    N/A Total 
           
  
 
CDA 1 1 2 1 11 16 
 
IS 2 4 1 1 8 
 
NUC 4 4 95 103 
 
OS 18 19 5 3 7 52 
 
UC 4 4 4 1 5 18 
 
Total 29 32 12 6 118 197 
 
 
 
 
Annual transaction volumes are summarized in table. Of 76 respondents that provided inputs 
other than N/A, 45 (i.e. 59 percent) had less than 10K annual purchase order transactions in 
scope for their PO discussion. Only 13 percent had annual transactions exceeding 100K. Both 
OS and UC had only 12 percent and 14 percent of the respondents belonging to firms that had 
annual purchase order transactions more than 100K in scope for the PO discussion. 
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Table 8: :Number of procurement employees in respondent‟s firm 
OSSTATUS 1–25 26–50 51–75 76–100 100+ TOTAL 
  
CDA 10 1 2 3 16 
 
 
IS 3 2 3 8 
 
 
NUC 74 12 3 5 9 103 
 
 
OS 28 10 4 2 8 52 
 
 
UC 5 6 3 4 18 
 
   TOTAL 120 31 10 9 27 197 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Scale Development and Purification  
 
Churchill provides the following sequence of steps and related calculations that can be 
performed in developing measures for multi item constructs. Multi item constructs help 
reduce measurement difficulties since (1) the specificity of the items can be averaged out 
when they are combined, (2) by combining items, relatively fine distinctions can be made 
between respondents, and (3) the reliability tends to increase and measurement error reduces 
as the number of items in a combination increases.  
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Figure 11: Suggested procedure for developing better measures 
                                 (Source: Churchill, 1979) 
 
5.4 SPECIFY DOMAIN OF THE CONSTRUCT & GENERATE SAMPLE OF ITEMS  
The constructs explained in the previous chapter were developed through careful analysis of 
the gamut of activities involved in indirect PO. Literature review, first-hand in-depth 
knowledge of the state of the discipline through participation in PO delivery, sales and 
operational excellence covering various clients over a period of over six years and 
brainstorming discussions held with faculty members and colleagues in industry constituted 
the steps that went into conceptualizing the constructs for this study.  
 
61 
MEASURE PURIFICATION  
 
The purpose of measurement is to estimate the score if all the items in a domain are used. In 
practice, however, only a sample of items is used and to the extent the items correlate with 
the true scores, the sample is good.104 The key assumption in the domain sampling model is 
that all items belonging to the domain of the concept have an equal amount of the common 
core. Therefore, if all items are drawn from the domain of a single construct, responses to 
those items should be highly correlated.  
 
Coefficient Alpha:  
The recommended measure of internal consistency of a set of items is provided by coefficient 
alpha.105 It is full of meaning since the square root of coefficient alpha is the estimated 
correlation of the k-item test with errorless true scores (Nunnally). Cronbach's α has long 
been considered a measure of the consistency of test components, that is, it measures how 
well a set of variables or items measures a single, uni-dimensional latent construct.  
Accordingly, item analysis was conducted for each of the multi-item dimensions within the 
constructs (example below). High values of coefficient alpha indicate that the k-item test 
correlates well with the true scores. In the example provided, the three items show coefficient 
alpha of 0.9023 indicating high correlation of the items within the dimension of „satisfaction 
with tactical buying before outsourcing‟; dropping one item at a time (omitted variable) does 
not bolster the already high coefficient alpha (there is only a very minor increase when the NI 
or need identification variable is dropped). As a result, all items within the dimension are 
retained. Similar analysis was conducted for all the other dimensions as well; in view of the 
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generally high coefficient alpha numbers achieved, no items were identified for elimination at 
this stage.  
Figure 12: Extract showing Item Analysis 
 
 
 
Factor Analysis 
 
Factor analysis is conducted next to identify / confirm the constructs as well as the 
dimensions within the constructs. Churchill
 
recommends the iterative sequence of calculation 
of coefficient alpha, elimination of items (through item analysis as discussed earlier), re-
calculation of coefficient alpha till a satisfactory level of 0.7 or above is achieved (in certain 
situations, lower levels have been considered acceptable)
 
followed by factor analysis.
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While conducting factor analysis, it was considered relevant to do so using the satisfaction (or 
risk) „before‟ with regard to items in questions 1–4. Among them, the first four questions 
have 57 variables whereas the number of responses are 197 (i.e. valid surveys received). As 
will be seen in the subsequent analysis, there are indeed some unique aspects of the situation 
„before‟ that are peculiar to the various OS status types and to that extent, it is appropriate to 
validate the constructs using the 197 data points. Since NUC which comprises 103 responses 
were not required to respond to „expected‟ and only IS and OS were required to respond to 
„after,‟ there were limitations in using the latter options for the factor analysis. One approach 
could be to reduce the number of items (and hence variables). However, since the items were 
generally mapped to the procurement process and also showed high coefficient alphas, it was 
considered prudent to not make any changes at this stage in the item set. Factor analysis, then, 
was conducted using questions 1–4 (satisfaction or risk before elements for the 57 items) and 
questions 11 and 13 (comprising 3 items each). Items 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 14 are either 
not applicable or were not responded to by NUC and have not been included in the factor 
analysis. They have however, been used to demonstrate the broad spread and 
representativeness of the sample (covered earlier in this chapter) and will be used for further 
focused research in this area of PO. Iteration: While conducting factor analysis, different 
iterations were tried to explore the minimum possible number of factors (or constructs) 
needed to adequately explain an acceptable level of variance. Factor Analysis was conducted 
using the Maximum Likelihood method of extraction. Below are sorted factor loadings 
obtained 125 with Varimax rotation. Communality figures show extent to which each 
variable is explained by the factors listed. 
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Table 9  Six factors identified through factor analysis 
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It can be seen that the six factors explain 58 percent of the variance in „satisfaction or risk 
before‟ scores of various variables. (If 8 factors were instead extracted, the variance 
explained would be 62.1 percent and with 12, it would be 70.6 percent. When principal 
component analysis was conducted, Eigen-values showed 12 components as having values of 
1 or above; this is relevant since various sources recommend extracting factors till this value 
of 1 is reached as being significant while those below 1 correspond to factors that are too 
weak or insignificant. For the 63 items, a component with an Eigen- value of 1 only explains 
1/63 i.e. 1.59 percent of the variance. Interestingly, factors started getting extracted at the 
level of dimensions which are included within the constructs and without any real overlap 
between the constructs. It was therefore considered appropriate to remain parsimonious in 
the number of factors utilized to account for the variance). 
 
The six factors identified fit the following broad descriptions:  
1. Factor 1 accounting for 15.1 percent of the variance is a subset of what was termed PC 
earlier on – it comprises of 16 of the 23 items contained in question 1 of the survey 
questionnaire and essentially aligns more closely with the narrower, procurement specific 
definition, sans (for the most part) the IT, Accounts Payable and Transformation related items 
which now fall under factor 3.  
2. Factor 2 accounting for 12.4 percent of the variance contains all the 13 variables from 
question 2 of the survey questionnaire pertaining to procurement competitive advantage 
(PCA). (One item i.e., „SB_PCA_IOC_LCR‟ „loaded‟ as borderline (last item) under factor 
1 is retained under PCA in the interest of consistency).  
3. Factor 3 (12.3 percent of the variance) shows up consistent with all the 13 variables 
covered under question 4 of the survey under the domain of business risk (BR).  
4. Factor 4 (7.2 percent of the variance) can be seen as pointing to the remaining seven items 
of question 1 of the survey questionnaire and generally pertains to what is needed to 
transform procurement, i.e., IT, change management, process automation / enablement and 
inclusion of end-to-end scope in the form of accounts payable. (One item, i.e., 13B_Labor 
Savings shown highlighted in red is dropped since it has weak loading / communality).  
5. Factor 5 (7.1 percent of the variance) fits with the various items contained in question 3 of 
the survey questionnaire and pertains to firm competitive advantage. (One item i.e. 
13A_Sourcing Savings shown highlighted in red is dropped since it has weak loading / 
communality).  
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6. Factor 6 (3.8 percent of the variance) maps to items contained in question 11 of the survey; 
this factor recognizes the extent to which procurement is considered a necessary imperative 
for the firm and may be termed, “strategic importance of procurement or SIP.” (Item 
13C_Compliance Imp shown highlighted in red is dropped since it has weak loading / 
communality). 
With the introduction of the new factor on procurement transformation and end-to-end 
competence, the new schematic (update of the one provided in Chapter 3 earlier) showing the 
various factors and OS Status types is depicted in figure below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ASSESS RELIABILITY 
It is pertinent to point out that the present situation of high level of consistency witnessed 
between the variables presented in the questionnaire (notably those clubbed together in the 
multi-item questions 1–4) and the ones identified during factor analysis is a happy one; 
careful attention to the manner in which the sample was drawn (as discussed at length earlier) 
coupled with the detailed list of items utilized to cover the domain of indirect PO, are steps 
that have helped address face or content validity requirements. Coefficient alpha is the basic 
statistic for determining the reliability of a measure based on internal consistency. Values of 
0.90 and above were calculated through item analysis for each of the factors identified and 
Figure 13- key Factors in Indirect Procurement Outsourcing (Revised) 
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omitted item alpha values were consistent with the overall alpha, implying that it was not 
appropriate to drop and reduce the number of variables.  
 
ASSESS CONSTRUCT VALIDITY  
Convergent validity to show that items that should be related to each other are in fact related 
within the same construct is demonstrated by significant loadings of the individual items on 
the latent constructs of PC, PCA, FCA, BR and PTE2E. In order to demonstrate discriminant 
validity, i.e., to show the absence of correlation between unrelated constructs, principal 
component analysis was conducted and it was found that the respective items loaded most 
heavily on the factors chosen.  
 
5.5 Data Analysis 
 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS  
Before testing the hypotheses, preliminary analysis was done to see whether, at a macro level, 
there are differences between the OS Status types. Discriminant analysis (refer Appendix H 
for details) showed the following summary classification: 
 
It is apparent then that there is separation between the OS Status types. What needs to be 
seen and established is how the variables contribute to the group separation.  
 
COMPARISON OF MEANS  
In order to understand the differences between the OS Status groups, it was considered 
relevant to compare the means to establish whether there were significant differences between 
them.  
For conducting the analysis BETWEEN OS Status types (e.g. between OS and NUC on 
procurement competence), analysis of variance was performed and the means compared, 
using Fisher‟s and Tukey‟s methods. The question for the analysis was: assuming 95 percent 
confidence intervals for means (based on pooled standard deviation), can we say that the 
means are indeed different between various PO Status type combinations?  
Tukey‟s HSD Method was applied with 90 percent simultaneous confidence level (i.e. 10 
percent error rate) which worked out to be (as an example) 98.59 percent confidence level 
(for the satisfaction or risk „before‟ case) at the individual level. Fisher‟s Method was applied 
at 95 percent individual confidence level (i.e., 5 percent error rate) or 71.69 percent 
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simultaneous confidence level (for the „before‟ case). The former, then, has more exacting a 
standard than the latter. It was considered relevant to try and understand the rigor with which 
the null hypotheses could be rejected and hence it was decided to apply both the Tukey and 
Fisher methods. Tukey is more conservative for the „expected minus before‟ case as well (90 
percent simultaneous confidence level corresponding to 98.55 percent individual confidence 
level compared to 95 percent individual confidence level corresponding to 72.08 percent 
simultaneous confidence level for the Fisher method). However, for the comparison „after 
minus expected‟ where there are only two groups i.e. IS and OS, there is no need for Tukey or 
Fisher comparisons. Instead, 2 sample t- tests are performed with 95 percent confidence 
interval.  
While conducting the analysis of variance, the normality assumption (a requirement), was 
tested using the Anderson-Darling normality test which requires p values to be greater than 
0.05 for a distribution to be considered normal. 
 
Figure14- Testing for Normality using Anderson-Darling Test 
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Wherever the normality assumption was not met (some have argued that ANOVA is 
relatively robust with respect to violations of the normality assumption
*
), the non- parametric 
Kruskal-Wallis test for comparing medians was applied in addition and it was found that the 
Tukey method was more conservative in all cases. Specifically, where a family-wide 
comparison between pairs of means on a certain item or variable showed the p value for 
Kruskal-Wallis as lower than 0.05 indicating significant difference in the median values, the 
Tukey test for comparison between means either indicated that there was a significant 
difference between at least one pair of means (support for the alternate hypothesis) or that the 
means were equal (the null hypothesis could not be disproved). In other words, in every 
situation where the distribution was not normal was the Kruskal Wallis test was less 
conservative than the Tukey test in terms of rejecting the null hypothesis.  
 
 
 
      While testing the hypotheses, a pragmatic approach was taken in making use of the 
available data (i.e., based on the 197 valid responses covering various OS Status types). To 
take the first construct of (perceived) procurement competence (PC) as an example, it is 
composed of 16 items (straddling 4 dimensions). Analysis was conducted at each item level 
to see whether the means were different (shown as „Yes‟ in table at Appendix ) and then the 
overall percent of cases where the response was „Yes‟ (i.e., means are not equal) was arrived 
at for the overall PC construct (simple addition and dividing the result by 16). Separately, 
analysis was conducted taking all the items within the construct as a single pool of data and 
analysis of variance conducted at the macro level, again to ascertain whether the means (for 
the overall construct) were equal. It was found (and to some extent for obvious reasons), that 
the former approach is more conservative in identifying means that are indeed different. 
Also, the former approach makes it possible to provide stronger insight into the areas where 
the means differ, not just at a macro level, but at the item or dimension levels. Extracts 
shown at tables 10 and 11  below illustrate the point. 
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Table 10: % of Items within Construct that Rejected the Null Hypothesis 
SATISFACTION BEFORE OR WITHOUT OUTSOURCING 
 
COMPARISON OF MEANS USING FISHER (RIGHT UPPER OF NA DIAGONAL) AND TUKEY (BOTTOM LEFT) 
METHODS 
 
S: Simultaneous, I: Individual; NA: Not Applicable 
 
% INDICATES ITEMS WITHIN CONSTRUCT 
FOR WHICH MEANS ARE NOT EQUAL 
 
 
FISHER (71.70% S; 95% I) TUKEY (90.0% S; 
98.59% I) 
  
CONSTRUCT 
 
OS STATUS 
 
 
CDA 
 
 
IS 
 
 
NUC 
 
 
OS 
 
 
UC 
 
 
 
PROCUREMENT COMPETENCE 
 
CDA 
 
NA 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
31% 
 
13% 
 IS 
 
6% 
 
 19% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
  
NA 
 
 
NUC 
 
0% 
 
6% 
 
 88% 
 
38% 
 
 
NA 
 
 
OS 
 
13% 
 
0% 
 
75% 
 
NA 
 
0% 
 UC 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
19% 
 
0% 
 
NA 
  
 
 
 
Table 11: Null Hypothesis rejection at the Overall Construct Level 
SATISFACTION BEFORE OR WITHOUT OUTSOURCING 
 
COMPARISON OF MEANS USING FISHER (RIGHT UPPER OF NA DIAGONAL) AND TUKEY (BOTTOM LEFT) 
METHODS 
 
S: Simultaneous, I: Individual; NA: Not Applicable 
 
YES INDICATES MEANS ARE NOT EQUAL FOR 
THE CONSTRUCT 
 
FISHER (71.70% S; 95% I) TUKEY (90.0% S; 
98.59% I) 
  
CONSTRUCT 
 
 
OS STATUS 
 
 
CDA 
 
 
IS 
 
 
NUC 
 
 
OS 
 
 
UC 
 
 
 
PROCUREMENT COMPETENCE 
 
CDA 
 
 NA 
 
 Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 IS 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
  
 
NA 
 
 
NUC 
 
 Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
NA 
 
 
OS 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
NA 
 UC 
 
Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
  
NA 
 
 
 
 
It can be seen that wherever there is a „Yes‟ in table 11, there is either 0 percent or a 
percentage greater than zero in Table 10. However, whenever there is a percentage greater 
than zero in Table 10, there is a Yes in all cases in Table 11. Table 10 then allows the ability 
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to not only say that the null hypothesis was disproved (if any of the cells is greater than zero, 
meaning that at least one of the means for the overall construct is different from the others), 
but also, the preponderance with which items within the construct disproved the null 
hypothesis, individually. This is provided using the Fisher method (cells on upper right of the 
NA diagonal) and the Tukey method (cells on bottom left of the NA diagonal). In this 
example, it can be seen that the NUC and OS means are different and the difference is fairly 
extensive compared to the difference between (say) IS and CDA. (The number of responses 
also plays an important role; even if the means are ostensibly different but the number of 
responses is limited, the range, for any confidence level, will have to be broader, making it 
more difficult for a pair of means to have mutually exclusive ranges). It should be mentioned 
that the ANOVA requirement of continuous rather than discrete data is met as a result of 
having multi item constructs so that the scores on each (when averaged) provide continuous 
data (the basis of table 11 above). Variance should be equal or almost equal for all OS types 
and this was tested using the 2 Variance method available in Minitab. Both the F-test (for 
normal distribution) and Levene‟s test (for any distribution) were performed. Values of p > 
0.05 indicate that the null hypothesis of equal variance cannot be rejected. Scores at the 
construct level indicated results such as the following, allowing the assumption of equal 
variance. 
 
Table 12: Summary Results of Hypotheses Testing 
 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
 
FINDING 
 
   
HYPOTHESIS 1A 
 
  
 
1AA0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) BEFORE or WITHOUT 
outsourcing is EQUAL, BETWEEN all the different 
OS Status types 
 
Not supported, except for PTE2E 
 
1AA1: 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT) BEFORE or WITHOUT 
outsourcing is NOT EQUAL, BETWEEN all the 
different OS Status types 
 
Supported, except for PTE2E 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1B 
 
  
 
1BA0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) EXPECTED from 
outsourcing MINUS BEFORE outsourcing is EQUAL, 
BETWEEN all the different OS Status types (all 
except NUC) 
 
Not supported, except for BR 
 
 
1BA1: 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) EXPECTED from 
outsourcing MINUS BEFORE outsourcing is NOT 
EQUAL, BETWEEN all the different OS Status types 
(all except NUC) 
 
Supported, except for BR 
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HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
 
FINDING 
   
HYPOTHESIS 1C 
 
  
 
1CA0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) AFTER outsourcing 
MINUS EXPECTED from outsourcing is EQUAL, 
BETWEEN OS Status types IS and OS 
 
Not supported, except for PCA and PTE2E 
 
1CA1: 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) AFTER outsourcing 
MINUS EXPECTED from outsourcing is NOT EQUAL, 
BETWEEN OS Status types IS and OS 
 
Supported, except for PCA and PTE2E 
 
   
HYPOTHESIS 2A 
 
  
 
2AA0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) EXPECTED from 
outsourcing MINUS BEFORE outsourcing is EQUAL 
TO ZERO, WITHIN each of the OS Status types (all 
except NUC) 
 
Not supported, except for PC (CDA) and BR 
(IS) 
 
 
2AA1: 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) EXPECTED from 
outsourcing MINUS BEFORE outsourcing is 
GREATER THAN ZERO, WITHIN each of the OS 
Status types (all except NUC) 
 
Supported, except for PC (CDA) and BR (IS) 
 
   
HYPOTHESIS 2B 
 
  
 
2BA0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) AFTER outsourcing 
MINUS EXPECTED from outsourcing is EQUAL TO 
ZERO, WITHIN OS Status types IS and OS 
 
Not supported, except for BR (IS) 
 
2BA1: 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean (CONSTRUCT X) AFTER outsourcing 
MINUS EXPECTED from outsourcing is LESS THAN 
ZERO, WITHIN OS Status types IS and OS 
 
Supported, except for BR (IS) 
 
   
HYPOTHESIS 3 
 
  
 
3A0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which different OS Status 
types view PROCUREMENT AS IMPORTANT to the 
firm is EQUAL 
 
Supported 
 
 
3A1: Alternate 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which different OS Status 
types view PROCUREMENT AS IMPORTANT to the 
firm is NOT EQUAL 
 
Not supported 
 
   
HYPOTHESIS 4 
 
  
 
4A0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which Client firms with Status 
IS or OS COLLABORATE EFFECTIVELY with the 
SERVICE PROVIDER is EQUAL 
 
Not supported 
 
 
4A1: Alternate 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which Client firms with Status 
IS or OS COLLABORATE EFFECTIVELY with the 
SERVICE PROVIDER is NOT EQUAL 
 
Supported 
 
   
HYPOTHESIS 5 
 
  
 
5A0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which different OS Status 
types view BENEFITS AS ACCRUING FROM 
OUTSOURCING is EQUAL 
 
Not supported 
 
 
5A1: Alternate 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which different OS Status 
types view BENEFITS AS ACCRUING FROM 
OUTSOURCING is NOT EQUAL 
 
Supported 
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HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
 
FINDING 
 HYPOTHESIS 6 
 
  
 
6A0: Null 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which different OS Status 
types view LOSS OF CONTROL from outsourcing 
CORE OR NON CORE activities to be unacceptable 
or acceptable (respectively) is EQUAL 
 
Not supported in respect of core 
Supported in respect of non‐core 
 
 
6A1: Alternate 
Hypothesis 
 
The mean extent to which different OS Status 
types view LOSS OF CONTROL from outsourcing 
CORE OR NON CORE activities to be unacceptable 
or acceptable (respectively) is NOT EQUAL 
 
Supported in respect of core 
Not supported in respect of non‐core 
 
 
 
5.6 Summary  
This chapter covered the sample for the study in terms of its various characteristics. 
Purification (covering item analysis, factor analysis and validation) were conducted next. 
Lastly, data analysis was carried out and hypothesis testing results were presented. The 
conclusions and recommendations from the data analysis are the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter draws conclusions from the results obtained in the previous chapter. Implications 
of the study for practice are discussed next. Limitations of the study are discussed thereafter 
followed by directions for future research.  
 
Research Overview  
Indirect procurement outsourcing is an area that is widely believed to be growing rapidly. In 
order to further the understanding of this subject, a more representative sample (compared to 
earlier samples that have focused almost exclusively on larger firms which have been the 
focus of mostly trade-based studies) of potential respondents was targeted through a mail 
survey questionnaire. Given that only a few firms have as yet outsourced (any or all of) their 
indirect procurement function and the challenge of obtaining a sufficiently large sample of 
respondents from this set of firms (explained at length in Chapter 4), it was decided that an 
interesting exploratory study could be made of understanding what is it that differentiates 
firms that have outsourced (OS) from others that have not – i.e. firms that have considered 
outsourcing but decided against (CDA), firms that had outsourced but later decided to in-
source (IS), firms for whom outsourcing is not under consideration (NUC) or firms that 
presently have outsourcing under consideration (UC). By so doing and including questions 
that required respondents to assess their satisfaction or risk perceptions in terms of „before (or 
without) outsourcing,‟ „expected from outsourcing,‟ and „after outsourcing,‟ on certain key 
attributes (which could be consolidated into clusters of attributes, i.e., factors), the study has 
been able to find certain interesting and highly revealing characteristics that are at play in the 
indirect procurement outsourcing domain. The approach to the analysis has been to carefully 
construct the survey instrument to include the gamut of scope, process, value, issue areas, 
etc., that are known (through literature and practice) to be relevant to indirect procurement 
outsourcing, obtain the sample responses covering various outsourcing scenarios (as 
mentioned earlier, while maximizing the probability of obtaining responses from firms that 
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have already outsourced), conducting purification measures addressing reliability and 
construct validity, and finally, conducting the analysis leading to identification of areas that 
can help direct future research.  
 
6.2 Discussion of Factors in Indirect Procurement Outsourcing  
 
Procurement competence (PC), procurement competitive advantage (PCA), firm competitive 
advantage (FCA), business risk (BR) and procurement transformation and end-to-end 
competence (PTE2E) are the key factors which this study has researched and analyzed to find 
the extent to which they differ with regard to each of the five indirect procurement 
outsourcing scenarios. The fifth construct of PTE2E was identified from the factor analysis 
as a separate construct and is an offshoot entirely of the earlier (and still very much retained) 
procurement competence (PC) construct: of the 23 items under the original PC, only 16 now 
remain whereas the other 7 items have been moved under the PTE2E construct. The approach 
taken was to validate the key constructs using mainly data points provided on perceived 
satisfaction (or risk levels) „BEFORE‟ scores (Q 1 to Q 4 of 141 survey). 
 
 
Most respondents were in a position to respond to „before‟ (or without) outsourcing whereas 
NUC respondents could not respond to „expected‟ and only IS and OS respondents could 
respond to „after‟ outsourcing. As will be discussed later in this chapter, there are differences 
between OS Status types on how they view their satisfaction or risk perceptions „before‟ or 
without outsourcing to be, and these to some extent may be impacting their perception of 
what they „expect‟ from outsourcing and in turn, what they perceive as being realized „after‟ 
outsourcing.  
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1:  
What are the key factors in indirect procurement outsourcing? What differentiating 
comparisons can be made BETWEEN each of the five indirect PO situations (i.e. OS Status), 
with regard to the key factors for outsourcing in terms of the following (Q. 1, 2, 3, 4 of 
Survey Questionnaire): 
a. Satisfaction or risk levels that exist „before‟ or without outsourcing.  
b. Increase or decrease in satisfaction or risk level „expected‟ from outsourcing compared to 
„before‟ or without outsourcing (not applicable for NUC).  
c. Increase or decrease in satisfaction or risk level „after‟ outsourcing compared to „expected‟ 
from outsourcing (applicable only to IS and OS).  
 
With reference to Question 1 a) of the research question, the results showed:  
PROCUREMENT COMPETENCE „BEFORE‟: Null hypothesis rejected.  
Note: All results shown in tables below are provided in consolidated form at Appendix D 
and therefore tables below are not numbered.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of satisfaction with procurement competence (PC), firms that considered but decided 
against (CDA) and firms that did not have indirect procurement outsourcing under 
consideration (NUC) had the highest mean scores.
 
Firms that outsourced (OS) or firms that 
outsourced but later in-sourced (IS) had lower levels of satisfaction mean scores. 
Taking a further conservative approach to refuting the null hypothesis, Tukey comparisons 
(shown in cells below and to the left of the NA diagonal) are considered. Fisher comparisons 
(upper right of the NA diagonal) provide an additional, balanced perspective about the 
preponderance or wide ranging nature of the inequality among the respective means, albeit 
with confidence lower than with Tukey‟s.  
It is interesting to note that those who are not considering outsourcing or those who 
considered and decided against outsourcing should believe their „before‟ procurement 
competence to be relatively high. While some of this may be indeed true, there may also be 
an element of “ignorance is bliss,” or undue smugness with the state of the discipline within 
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these firms. While separate research will be needed to objectively determine their true 
procurement competence and benchmark it against others, this information should be relevant 
to procurement outsourcing sales professionals who may want to gauge at the very outset, 
what prospective clients think of their procurement competence. Those that already rate it 
high on the items in the survey questionnaire (or a similar adaptation) may not after all be the 
right client firms to pursue, unless of course, that mindset can be changed to recognize the 
gaps that exist (if indeed they do). Procurement outsourcing engagements (period prior to 
contract signing) can be long drawn and expensive and an initial validation or „true up‟ of the 
state of procurement competence can potentially help to improve the win rate: if a client is 
already fairly satisfied, there is less reason to pursue the engagement. 
 
Under consideration firms are similar to the IS and OS firms on PC score; only some of the 
UC firms in the end will actually outsource, with some ending up as CDA.  
 
 
PROCUREMENT COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE „BEFORE‟: Null hypothesis rejected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UC and OS firms show the lowest satisfactions scores on PCA „before‟ outsourcing with 
CDA, IS and NUC at higher, similar levels. One would have expected IS to have low 
„before‟ scores as well, for after all they did decide to outsource and it must have been (one 
would imagine) with good reason. Two arguments to the contrary: it is possible that IS 
respondents now believe (after having in-sourced, possibly with some grief) that their PCA 
satisfaction „before‟ outsourcing was actually relatively high (especially if they subsequently 
did not obtain adequate value and therefore had to in- source – more on this later when the 
difference between „after‟ minus „expected‟ is discussed); alternatively, it is possible that 
their PCA was indeed high and they had to (for some reason) outsource (e.g., the 
transformation executive believed outsourcing was a good idea even though the CPO did not 
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but in the end decided to simply tow the leadership line), only to discover later that the status 
quo ante (i.e., without outsourcing) was actually a better situation after all. Of course there 
can be other interpretations as well.  
 
NUC and CDA firms may have a false sense of comfort that their PCA is in better shape than 
it really is. Only through careful business case and process analysis (often with help from a 
neutral third party advising or consulting firm proficient in the discipline) can firms truly 
begin to appreciate areas where PCA may be lacking – e.g. hidden or “shadow” costs of staff 
(e.g. secretaries or administrative assistants) performing sundry procurement tasks as part of 
their normal duties, tasks that do not allow building of “rhythm” and hence better 
productivity that is possible from a dedicated procurement team or (as another example) 
where procurement savings are not calculated in a systematic manner with the right controls 
and the available savings data has not been objectively audited or approved by a third party 
(e.g., finance).  
 
 
 
FIRM COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE „BEFORE‟: Null hypothesis rejected 
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 The results for FCA are similar to the results for PCA: there are significant differences 
between UC and CDA, UC and IS, UC and NUC and UC and OS. BUSINESS RISK 
„BEFORE‟: Null hypothesis rejected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business risk „before,‟ in general, was not much different for various OS Status types. It is 
relevant to point out that the macro level BR construct is actually disproved more strongly 
than appears conservatively from the table above. As can be seen below, the null hypothesis 
at a macro level for the construct is disproved for all combinations of CDA with other OS 
Status types and not just OS–NUC.  
 
 
Table 13: Hypothesis Test Results for Business Risk „Before‟  
 
BR CDA 
CDA IS NUC OS UC Mean 
NA  Yes   3.0 
IS   Yes   2.9  NA  
NUC Yes Yes NA Yes Yes 3.2 
OS   Yes   3.0  NA  
UC   Yes  
 
2.9 
 NA  
Mean 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.0 2.9  
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PROCUREMENT TRANSFORMATION AND E2E COMPETENCE „BEFORE‟: Null 
hypothesis NOT rejected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Firms do not appear to be differentiated from each other in terms of PTE2E satisfaction 
levels „before.'  
With reference to Question 1 b) of the research question, the results showed:  
PROCUREMENT COMPETENCE, „EXPECTED‟ MINUS „BEFORE‟:  
Null hypothesis rejected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
OS and UC firms were significantly different from CDA firms with both OS and UC showing 
much higher „expected‟ procurement competence than „before‟ in comparison to CDA firms. 
Interestingly, IS firms did not „expect‟ as high an increase in PC to come from outsourcing as 
OS and UC firms did. Some of the UC firms will later convert to CDA or OS and it is 
interesting to note therefore that the figure of 1.4 lies between 1.8 (for OS) and 0.3 (for 
CDA).  
 
PROCUREMENT COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, „EXPECTED‟ MINUS „BEFORE‟:  
Null hypothesis rejected.  
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 UC firms „expect‟ far greater procurement competitive advantage than „before‟ to come from 
indirect procurement outsourcing in comparison to CDA or IS firms followed by OS firms 
which too are similarly differentiated from CDA and IS firms.  
 
FIRM COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, „EXPECTED‟ MINUS „BEFORE‟: Null hypothesis 
rejected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Somewhat similar to PCA, UC firms followed by OS firms „expect‟ greater firm competitive 
advantage than „before‟ to accrue from indirect procurement outsourcing in comparison to 
CDA or IS firms. It is interesting to note (from the last three sections) that though OS has 
greater expectation than UC of increasing PC through outsourcing, it is UC that has greater 
expectation of increasing PCA as well as FCA from outsourcing. So much for “high hopes,” 
some of which are evidently not realistic and will result in less than a 100 percent win rate for 
outsourcing service providers.  
 
 
BUSINESS RISK, „EXPECTED‟ MINUS „BEFORE‟: Null hypothesis NOT rejected.  
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 Contrary to what one would expect, the study did not find evidence of differences in extra 
business risk expected from outsourcing. It is possible that business risk is an element that 
firms have not focused on enough in a consistent, uniform manner, to be able to have 
objective responses.  
 
PROCUREMENT TRANSFORMATION AND E2E COMPETENCE, „EXPECTED‟ 
MINUS „BEFORE‟: Null hypothesis rejected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OS and UC firms differed significantly from CDA and IS firms in terms of the extent to 
which they „expected‟ PTE2E competence to increase compared to „before.‟ As will be 
shown later in the „after‟ minus „expected‟ scenario, almost all of IS firms‟ hopes are dashed.  
 
With reference to Question 1 c) of the research question, the results showed: 
 
PROCUREMENT COMPETENCE, „AFTER‟ MINUS „EXPECTED‟: Null hypothesis 
rejected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two sample tests (two tailed) were performed for all „after‟ minus „expected‟ comparisons 
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(this case plus next 4 cases) to find out the significance of the differences between the means 
of IS and OS (no need for Tukey or Fisher methods) at 95 percent confidence level. The 
figure in the OS – IS cell is identical and is shown thus only in the interest of consistency of 
presentation: as stated earlier, this should not be confused with Tukey or Fisher confidence 
levels, etc. (which were used for „before‟ and „expected‟ minus „before‟ for the multi group 
comparisons). Both IS and OS showed a drop in satisfaction „after‟ compared to „expected‟ 
but the drop was more dramatic for IS. Comparison of the drop shows that the two OS Status 
types are differentiated and have unequal means, with no overlap between the 95 percent 
confidence intervals for the „after‟ minus „before‟ satisfaction ranges.  
 
 
PROCUREMENT COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, „AFTER‟ MINUS „EXPECTED‟: Null 
hypothesis is NOT rejected. 
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 Though PCA „after‟ minus „expected‟ shows a drop for both the IS and the OS case, the 
difference between them is not statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
Mean satisfaction level for IS actually drops a shade below even the „before‟ satisfaction 
level. This indicates acknowledgement from the respondents that they believe the 
competence level stagnated or almost deteriorated with the foray into outsourcing.  
 
FIRM COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, „AFTER‟ MINUS „EXPECTED‟: Null hypothesis 
rejected. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Firm competitive advantage deteriorated for both IS and OS „after‟ outsourcing compared to 
„expected‟ from outsourcing with a statistically significant higher drop for IS compared to 
OS. This analysis can give an indication to service providers about the extent to which client 
expectations are falling short.  
 
 
BUSINESS RISK, „AFTER‟ MINUS „EXPECTED‟: Null hypothesis rejected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The range for the higher increase in business risk for IS shows significantly different than the 
range for the lower increase in business risk for OS. Whereas business risk increased for IS, 
it actually showed a decrease for OS. The 2-sample t-test results showed that 23 percent of 
the items had means for business risk „after‟ minus business risk „expected‟ that were 
significantly different.  
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PROCUREMENT TRANSFORMATION AND E2E COMPETENCE, „AFTER‟ MINUS 
„EXPECTED‟: Null hypothesis NOT rejected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both IS and OS perceived a drop in PTE2E from outsourcing but the mean drop of each was 
not significantly different. 2. What differentiating comparison can be made WITHIN each of 
the five indirect PO situations (i.e. OS Status), with regard to the key factors for outsourcing 
in terms of the following (Q. 1, 2, 3, 4 of Survey Questionnaire): a. Increase or decrease in 
satisfaction or risk level „expected‟ from outsourcing compared to „before‟ or without 
outsourcing (not applicable for NUC) b. Increase or decrease in satisfaction or risk level 
„after‟ outsourcing compared to „expected‟ from outsourcing (applicable only to IS and OS). 
 
With reference to Question 2 a) of the research question, the results showed:
Table 14  Test Results for One-Tailed Test (Mean Expected > Mean Before) 
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Paired t-tests were performed on each of the four OS Status types, i.e., CDA, IS, OS and UC 
to test whether the mean „expected‟ score for each (separately for CDA, IS, OS and UC) was 
equal to the mean „before‟ score or greater than the mean „before‟ score (i.e., one-tailed test) 
for each with at least 95 percent confidence level (p < 0.05). The percentages in the table 
above indicate the percent of items in each construct that rejected the null.  
Clearly, OS and UC showed greatest expected gains from PC, PCA, FCA and PTE2E, with 
all items on each of the constructs rejecting the null hypothesis of equality of means (p values 
< 0.05). For the construct as a whole, the p value is 0.00000001. Business risk perception 
increased too, albeit not as extensively, and somewhat more for UC (in terms of significance) 
than for OS.  
In general, increases for IS were significant as well, and fairly extensive, except for BR for 
which the null hypothesis could not be rejected. In the case of CDA, PC means were not 
expected to increase significantly (null hypothesis of equality not rejected) but other means 
showed increases that were significant enough to reject the null hypotheses. 
 
With reference to Question 2 b) of the research question, the results showed:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Paired t-tests were performed on IS and OS to test whether the mean „after‟ score for each 
(separately for IS and OS) was equal to the mean „expected‟ score or lesser than the mean 
„expected‟ score (i.e. one-tailed test) for each with at least 95 percent confidence level (p < 
0.05). OS showed widespread evidence of the mean „after‟ being significantly lower than the 
mean „expected‟ (despite lower values of mean difference, the evidence for rejecting the null 
is stronger on account of the larger number of responses for OS, compared to IS).  
 
 
Table 15: Test Results for One-Tailed Test (Mean after < Mean expected) 
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3. Are there significant differences BETWEEN different OS Status types in terms of the 
extent to which they view procurement as important to the firm? (Q. 11 A, B, C of Survey 
Questionnaire).  
The questions on the extent to which procurement has caught the attention of the top 
management, top management support for improving the procurement function and whether 
procurement is considered a vital part of the firm‟s corporate strategy showed a high 
coefficient alpha (0.89) from item analysis. The three items together relate to importance the 
firm ascribes to procurement. Analysis of the means shows that the null hypothesis of 
equality of the means cannot be rejected (p value 0.214). OS, UC and NUC firms seem to 
give roughly equal importance to procurement but it cannot be shown that this is significantly 
different from the others, i.e., CDA or IS. A larger number of responses are needed to have 
narrower ranges that may be able to reject the null hypothesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are there significant differences BETWEEN OS Status types IS and OS in terms of the extent 
of collaboration with the service provider? (Q. 12 A, B, C of Survey Questionnaire). It was 
found, based on omitted item analysis, that removing item 12 c) improved Cronbach‟s alpha 
(up from 0.7414 to 0.8156). Planning together with the service provider and cooperating with 
each other to ensure execution of planned initiatives is an indicator of effective collaboration 
between the two parties. A two sample T-test (in which equal variance does not have to be 
assumed), found the means to be significantly different. 
Figure 15 Extract of means comparison of procurement importance to firm 4. 
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Firms that in-sourced appear to have lower levels of collaboration than firms that did not. 
Though data points available for IS are somewhat few, this does point to the need for 
conducting more case study type research on these firms to better understand the root causes 
and possible fixes. Each instance of in-sourcing is bad publicity for outsourcing and various 
stakeholders should be interested in supporting such research. 5. Are there significant 
differences BETWEEN OS Status types in terms of the extent to which they view outsourcing 
as capable of increasing savings, reducing costs or improving compliance? (Q. 13. A, B, C of 
Survey Questionnaire). Extent to which respondents believed that sourcing savings could be 
significantly improved, labor costs significantly reduced and end user compliance 
significantly improved can be considered a reflection of how far indirect procurement 
outsourcing is thought to further procurement competitive advantage. It was seen that with a 
p- value of 0.000 the null hypothesis of equal means could be rejected.
Figure 16 Extract of two sample t-test for collaboration 
 
 
Figure 17- Extract of comparison for benefits potential from outsourcing 
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Variance needs to be roughly equal for running the ANOVA and this was checked using the 2 
variance test, which showed that the equal variance hypothesis could not be rejected.  
Interestingly, it can be seen that CDA and NUC did not believe as strongly as did UC or OS 
that outsourcing could increase the benefits significantly. This corroborates earlier evidence 
seen in response to Research Question 1 b) where OS and UC had significantly higher 
expectations for increase in PCA from outsourcing compared to the others. 6. Are there 
significant differences BETWEEN OS Status types in terms of the extent to which they view 
loss of control from outsourcing core or non core activities to be unacceptable or acceptable? 
(Q. 14. A, B of Survey Questionnaire). Firms often fear losing control over the procurement 
function as a result of outsourcing. The means for responses on whether it was „not a good 
thing‟ that there should be loss of control over core procurement activities were different 
(with a p value of 0.001), with the highest agreement from CDA, IS and NUC. OS and UC 
were more accepting, with UC the most accepting.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar responses to loss of control over non-core activities from outsourcing showed that OS 
and UC were more accepting than the others, though the null hypothesis of differences in the 
means cannot be rejected. 
 
Interestingly, breaking down the loss of control argument into core and non-core showed that 
while not all the OS Status type means were equal with regard to core activities, they were 
not significantly different when it came to non-core activities.  
 
 
Figure 18: Extract of comparison for loss of control from outsourcing 
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6.3 Implications for Practice  
It has been established in this study that of the five OS Status types, satisfaction before 
outsourcing or without outsourcing is higher for firms that considered but decided against 
outsourcing and those that do not even have outsourcing under consideration. Firms that 
considered and decided against outsourcing may have made the proper informed decision 
after due examination of the value proposition from outsourcing. They may therefore be right 
in concluding that higher levels of satisfaction are available with the status quo. What should 
be of enormous interest to the practitioner is that firms that have not even considered 
outsourcing should believe that they are doing fairly well with their existing procurement 
function. Often the maturity of a firm‟s procurement organization is a function of its size 
(revenue, spend, number of employees, etc.). It is seen that of the 197 respondents, 120 
represented firms with procurement departments smaller than 25 employees.
 
Thirty-one had 
between 26 and 50 procurement employees. It appears that most of these firms are small or 
medium in size. Of the 103 NUC respondents, 74 represented firms with less than 25 
employees and 12 with 26 to 50 employees. It is  
generally thought that procurement sophistication increases with size of the firm – how is it 
then that NUC should have distinctly high satisfaction levels with their PC, PCA and FCA? 
Is it objectively true or is it just a belief with these firms that they are more state of the art 
than they really are? There is thus an opportunity for understanding this segment better, and 
part of that understanding might well lead to the identification of a new business model for 
outsourcing for these firms. For example, is there a “direct” model which can allow them to 
simply “connect” to an outsourcing “infrastructure” provided by a service provider and pay 
for services on a per transaction or similar basis?  
It is noticed that PTE2E competence, among all the constructs (followed by BR), has the least 
differentiation between the various OS Status types. Considering that various enabling 
technologies already exist (e.g. ERP systems, spend analysis and contracting tools, automated 
and seamless systems from requisitioning to purchase order processing to invoice processing, 
means to run and analyze RFP‟s electronically, reverse auctions, etc.) and indeed some of the 
established service providers do demonstrate these capabilities as their differentiators 
(Accenture and IBM are generally reputed to be most advanced with regard to IT and end-to-
end capabilities), why then is this lack of differentiation the case? Is this just a case of lack of 
awareness or is it that actual delivery experience has not been all that positive for the good 
word to go around? In the author‟s experience, IT integration is an area (if in scope) where 
the client typically has high expectations of the service provider and if the deployment or 
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integration, etc., do not go as planned, not only is the rest of the deployment endangered (on 
account of dependencies on IT systems) but also, the relationship can be soured at the very 
outset. To usher in a new business model (as discussed in the previous paragraph) will require 
a new level of innovation and commitment in terms of successfully building the desired level 
of PTE2E capability. This will remain a major challenge for the practitioners. Even though 
business risk did not show to be a strong differentiator overall, it is seen that IS Status type 
was markedly different from OS Status type in terms of business risk increasing from 2.9 
(„before‟) to 3.7 („after‟) for IS compared to an increase from 3.0 („before‟) to 2.9 („after) for 
OS (Appendix C). The 2-sample t-test results showed that 23 percent of the items had means 
for business risk „after‟ minus business risk „expected‟ that were significantly different.  
Interestingly, 37 of the 45 (out of total 52) OS respondents indicated that their annual spend 
in scope for outsourcing was less than Tk 100 lac.18 of the 37 had annual spend of less than 
Tk 10 lac. The normal argument made by the reputed service providers has been that 
outsourcing is viable for them only if there is significant enough scope in play (say more than 
1 crore annually). What then about these smaller spend outsourcing instances? This is an 
area that needs to be investigated and better understood perhaps. There are already some 
leads available, awaiting to be discovered. It is pertinent to point out that responses were 
solicited for the question, “ANY indirect procurement related activity, including ANY 
support activity (e.g. procurement help desk, deployment of procurement IT platform or 
maintenance) that is relevant to the outsourcing (OS) discussion for your firm and provide 
your answers with that activity or set of such activities as a reference point.” Again, there 
may be potential to provide a different, better business model to tap smaller spend scope 
opportunities, of which there already appears to be reasonable evidence of some level of 
success. This has implications for various constituents, including academic researchers.  
Sales professionals can benefit from the research in various ways. An early assessment of a 
prospective client on a fairly broad-based set of factors, in terms of existing satisfaction or 
risk perception levels and expectations from outsourcing, can help better understand the 
opportunity areas where value proposition needs to be built. It can also help disengage faster 
from opportunities that are “not likely to go anywhere soon.” After all, it is important to 
conserve precious money to chase opportunities where the win rate can be higher. This can 
be good for the client too. Often the client may erroneously believe its procurement 
competitive advantage to be already high. This may be inferred by the prospective service 
provider from discussions with the client or the contents of the RFP documents. In order for 
the service provider‟s value proposition to be fully appreciated, it is essential that the client‟s 
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base case be better aligned with the true ground reality. An apples-to-apples comparison for 
the same scope to be assumed by the service provider as is originally catered to by the client 
is necessary for any meaningful business case analysis. In such a situation, the client may be 
better served in first taking the time to conduct its own true base case analysis and validation, 
without getting distracted in engaging prospective service providers on the RFP.  
 
6.4 Limitations of the Research  
This research study, like any other, has its limitations. Some of the main ones are: 
1 .  Responses were sought from members of a professional organization (i.e., the CIPS). 
Therefore, only members of CIPS or IEB will have a chance to provide their inputs to the 
survey questionnaire. The results will therefore be applicable to this set of respondents and 
can be generalized to the larger population only to the extent that it resembles the 
respondents.  
2.  The overall response rate of 5.04 percent and valid response rate of 4.07 percent is rather 
small. Admittedly, the response rate for firms that have outsourced or outsourced and later 
in-sourced is much higher (estimated to be 67 percent) in terms of the number of respondents 
that could really have belonged to these two OS Status types from among the mail survey 
respondents. This means that the response rate without OS and IS respondents would have 
been even lower. It is possible that potential respondents representing other firms, e.g., those 
that do not have indirect procurement under consideration for outsourcing (i.e. NUC) were 
somewhat more indifferent to providing their inputs than the ones that did provide their 
inputs.  
3. It limits its scope within Bangladesh based firms, so generalization of indirect procurement 
outsourcing with a worldwide application will not be appropriate.  
 
6.5 Directions for Future Research  
Firstly, the nature of the research in this study has been exploratory and has concentrated 
mainly on identifying the differences that exist between different OS Status types in terms of 
the key constructs of PC, PCA, FCA, BR and PTE2E. The constructs themselves will need 
further rigor in terms of definition, reliability and validity. The differences identified between 
OS Status types will need to be revisited for separate, independent confirmation, periodically, 
to ascertain whether they continue to still apply or whether there are measures that have been 
taken (e.g., by service providers) that have altered the dynamic.  
93 
There is an opportunity to research the entire value proposition around indirect procurement 
outsourcing from various angles. In order to do this effectively, objective and consistent 
performance metrics are needed. Benchmarking agencies need to better define the boundaries 
around which comparisons will be made. Too often, performance is measured in a myopic 
manner (there is some level of opportunism in this too) – e.g., automating more purchase 
orders makes the hands-on percentage (i.e. manual purchase orders divided by total purchase 
orders) look less attractive; why then would the procurement operations manager be 
motivated to improve automation, especially if the client contract has been negotiated on a 
per transaction basis separately for automated orders (lower rate) and manual orders (higher 
rate). Obviously, the trick has to be to bring to the fore the core business metrics (that are 
super-ordinate to the business) and optimize them. How do they get included in the contract 
effectively, yet simply enough, in order to drive positive behavior on the part of the service 
provider and the client in the advancement of the supply chain discipline? This is no trivial 
matter – for starters, the client may just not want or have the patience to change from the 
earlier metric system or definitions.  
One area worthy of independent research (possibly through the center(s) for supply chain 
research that some business schools have established) is the notion of leverage that service 
providers are perceived as bringing to the table for clients. The kinds of leverage mostly 
talked about are – spend, process, technology and people.  
Business risk is an area that showed relatively minor significant difference between various 
OS Status types in this study (except the comparison between OS and IS Status types with 
regard to „after‟ minus „before‟ scores). There is need to define the various areas of business 
risk in outsourcing with greater detail and potentially starting a rating system for certain 
outsourcing locations, service scope areas, etc. For example, what is the impact of delivering 
service through low cost delivery locations on compliance with the provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Similarly, to what extent does business risk on dimensions such as 
opportunism, information asymmetry, etc., tie in with the precepts of agency theory? These 
areas of research should be very relevant given the sensitivity around the general topic of 
outsourcing that has arisen within the context of the post-2007 decline in world economic 
conditions.
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                                                                             APPENDIX A 
 
 
   SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROCUREMENT COMPETENCE 
1. Please select the outsourcing (OS) scenario that best represents the situation of your firm regarding the OS of its indirect procurement activity (please check one) 
Activity has already been outsourced 
Activity was considered for outsourcing (OS) but a decision was taken not to outsource (OS) (LEAVE “SATISFACTION AFTER” COLUMN BLANK) 
Activity is presently under consideration for OS and a decision whether or not to OS has still to be made (LEAVE “SATISFACTION AFTER” COLUMN BLANK) 
Activity is not under consideration for OS at this time (LEAVE “SATISFACTION EXPECTED” AND “SATISFACTION AFTER” COLUMNS BLANK) 
Activity was outsourced but a decision was taken to terminate the contract and in-source back to your firm (in this case AFTER represents before in-sourcing) 
 
Please start by indicating which of the MAIN SCOPE AREAS below (i.e. A, B, C, D, E, F, G) are relevant to your firm’s outsourcing (OS) discussion (check those that 
apply). For main scope areas that ARE NOT CHECKED, only complete the IMPORTANCE and SATISFACTION BEFORE columns. 
 
 
 
 
A. STRATEGIC SOURCING 
Develop category profile (spend / need / market analysis) 
Develop sourcing strategy (category positioning analysis, etc) 
Generate supplier portfolio (identify all viable suppliers) 
Conduct RFP, reverse auction etc. 
Negotiate and select suppliers (negotiation strategy, etc.) 
Implement agreements (implementation plan, rules updates) 
Continuous improvement (monitor and plan for next round) 
B. STRATEGY MANAGEMENT 
Contract management (e.g. metrics, issue resolution, etc.) 
Supply market monitoring (e.g. key indices, benchmarks, etc.) 
Evaluation & performance management (e.g. customer sat.) 
C. TACTICAL BUYING 
Need identification 
Tactical buying strategy determination 
Ongoing buying – execution & negotiation 
D. ORDER MANAGEMENT 
Supplier & end user enablement (WOI, EDI, e-Pro, etc.) 
Content / catalog administration 
Review requisitions & place purchase orders 
Customer & supplier assistance (help desk) 
E. ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 
Invoice processing 
F. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
Deploy / enhance / integrate procurement platform 
Ongoing maintenance and hosting, etc. 
G. PROCUREMENT TRANSFORMATION 
Change management 
Process automation 
Compliance (adherence to policies and procedures) ramp up 
Importance 
V. V 
Unimp. Imp. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Satisfaction Before 
V. V. 
Unsat. Sat. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Satisfaction Expected 
V. V. 
Unsat. Sat. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Satisfaction After 
V. V. 
Unsat. Sat. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
PROCUREMENT COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
2. Please select the outsourcing (OS) scenario that best represents the situation of your firm regarding the OS of its indirect procurement activity 
(Check one: copy to repeat selection from previous page). 
Activity has already been outsourced 
Activity was considered for outsourcing (OS) but a decision was taken not to outsource (OS) (LEAVE “SATISFACTION AFTER” COLUMN BLANK) 
Activity is presently under consideration for OS and a decision whether or not to OS has still to be made (LEAVE “SATISFACTION AFTER” COLUMN BLANK) 
Activity is not under consideration for OS at this time (LEAVE “SATISFACTION EXPECTED” AND “SATISFACTION AFTER” COLUMNS BLANK) 
Activity was outsourced but a decision was taken to terminate the contract and in-source back to your firm (in this case AFTER represents before in-sourcing) 
 
Please provide your response on each of the following areas of PROCUREMENT COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE that may be impacted by indirect procurement OS 
 
 
 
 
A. IMPACT ON OPERATIONAL COSTS 
Procurement labor cost reduction 
Employee productivity 
B. IMPACT ON COMPLIANCE & END USERS 
Reduced maverick or by-pass spend 
Service levels; E.g. cycle time, deliveries, issue resolution 
Adherence to purchase policies & procedures 
C. IMPACT ON OVERALL BUSINESS 
Enterprise-wide spend visibility 
Spend aggregation and leverage 
Improved sourcing savings 
Improved supplier relationships 
Reduction of existing supply base 
Ability to drive business unit budget reductions from savings 
Applying OS lessons learned to avoid repeating mistakes 
Ability of procurement team to focus better on key areas 
Importance 
V. V 
Unimp. Imp. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Satisfaction Before 
V. V. 
Unsat. Sat. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Satisfaction Expected 
V. V. 
Unsat. Sat. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Satisfaction After 
V. V. 
Unsat. Sat. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
FIRM COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
3. Please provide your response on each of the following areas of FIRM COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE that may be impacted by indirect procurement OS 
 
Ability to focus better on core competencies 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Ability to improve market positioning 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Ability to improve market share for product or service 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Ability to enter new or emerging markets 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Ability to rapidly acquire or divest for growth 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Ability to follow outsourcing trend; not be left behind rivals 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Win favorable rating from Wall Street / financial analysts 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Ability to improve audit and compliance posture (e.g., SEC*) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
* Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5                        1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
BUSINESS RISK 
4. Please select the outsourcing (OS) scenario that best represents the situation of your firm regarding the OS of its indirect procurement activity 
(Check one: copy to repeat selection from previous page). 
Activity has already been outsourced 
Activity was considered for outsourcing (OS) but a decision was taken not to outsource (OS) (LEAVE “RISK AFTER” COLUMN BLANK) 
Activity is presently under consideration for OS and a decision whether or not to OS has still to be made (LEAVE “RISK AFTER” COLUMN BLANK) 
Activity is not under consideration for OS at this time (LEAVE “RISK EXPECTED” AND “RISK AFTER” COLUMNS BLANK) 
Activity was outsourced but a decision was taken to terminate the contract and in-source back to your firm (in this case AFTER represents before in-sourcing) 
 
Please provide your response on each of the following areas of BUSINESS RISK that may be impacted by indirect procurement OS 
 
Importance 
V. V 
Unimp. Imp. 
 
A.UNCERTAINTY (ambiguity of transaction definition and performance) 
Scope of work to be performed is well defined 1 2 3 4 5 
Service levels to measure against are well defined 1 2 3 4 5 
Governance model for responsibility and accountability is clear 1 2 3 4 5 
Contractual requirements are well defined 1 2 3 4 5 
Risk Before 
V.              V. 
Low High 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Risk Expected 
V. V. 
Low High 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Risk After 
V. V. 
Low High 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
B. OPPORTUNISM (people are prone to opportunistic behavior, leading to self interest seeking with cleverness rather than frankness) 
Interactions between players are trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Reward (or penalty) for over (or under) achievement is equitable 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Entry (or exit) cost for starting (or ending) relationship is equal 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
C. BOUNDED RATIONALITY (rationality of human behavior is limited by the ability of the person to fully process or remember information) 
Ease of grasping information fully on account of individual 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
limitations or environmental complexity, etc. 
Tendency to make quick, rule of thumb decisions rather 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
than painstaking, optimal decisions 
Tendency to cooperate with wrong priorities or players (on 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
account of factors such as goodwill, pressure to conform, etc.) 
 
D.INFORMATION ASYMMETRY (asymmetrical or unequal distribution of information among two parties so that one has more knowledge than the other) 
Ease of obtaining complete, verifiable information 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
E. SMALL NUMBERS (transactions which are seldom performed do not benefit from scale or synergy that comes with frequent transactions) 
A few transactions have very high costs                                        1 2 3 4 5                        1 2 3 4 5                        1 2 3 4 5                        1 2 3 4 5 
Frequency of few high cost items varies widely                            1 2 3 4 5                        1 2 3 4 5                        1 2 3 4 5                        1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GENERAL 
 
5.  If your firm has already outsourced (OS) any indirect procurement, how many years has it been since it was outsourced (OS)? (Choose N/A if not applicable) 
A. Less than 1 year 
B. More than 1 years but less than 2 years 
C. More than 2 years but less than 3 years 
D. More than 3 years 
E. N/A 
 
6.  If your firm has already OS any indirect procurement, what is the duration of the OS contract that has been signed with service provider? (Choose N/A if not applicable) 
A. 3 years 
B. More than 3 years up to 5 years 
C. More than 5 years up to 7 years 
D. More than 7 years 
E. N/A 
 
7. If your firm had previously OS any indirect procurement and later decided to terminate the contract and in-source that scope (please fill in the blanks, otherwise state N/A): 
Outsourcing was started in _____________ (enter Year, e.g. 20010) for a ____________Year contract (# of years) and terminated in ___________(enter Year) 
 
8. If your firm has outsourced, is considering outsourcing or previously outsourced procurement, what is the annual managed Spend in scope for OS (please state N/A if not 
applicable) 
A. Less than 10 lac 
B. 10 lac -100lac  
C. 1  crore -10  crore  
D. Over 10 crore 
E. N/A 
 
9. If your firm has outsourced, is considering outsourcing or previously outsourced procurement, what is the annual # of purchase order transactions in scope for OS (please 
state N/A if not applicable) 
A. Less than 1,000 transactions 
B. 1,000 – 10,000 transactions 
C. 10,000 – 100,000 transactions 
D. Over 100,000 transactions 
E. N/A 
 
10. Please express your firm’s total annual purchase (TK) divided by the total annual sales (TK) as a percentage  
       A. Less than 10% 
B. Between 10% and 20% 
C. Between 20% and 30% 
D. Between 30% and 40% 
E. More than 40% 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Please Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:                                      Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
A. Procurement has caught the attention of the top management 1 2 3 4 5 
B. Top management is supportive of efforts to improve the procurement function 1 2 3 4 5 
C. Procurement is considered a vital part of the firm’s corporate strategy 1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements about Client firm and Service Provider firm (answer only if procurement is already 
outsourced, otherwise skip this question): 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
A. We work and plan together 1 2 3 4 5 
B. We cooperate with each other to ensure execution of planned initiatives 1 2 3 4 5 
C. Disagreements are rare and easily resolved 1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:                                      Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
A. Sourcing savings for my firm can increase significantly from OS 1 2 3 4 5 
B. Labor costs for my firm can reduce significantly from OS 1 2 3 4 5 
C. End user compliance with procurement policies and procedure can increase significantly from OS 1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements (select N/A if not applicable): 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
A. By OS, my firm runs risk of losing control over core Procurement activities which is not a good thing.                1 
B. By OS, my firm runs risk of losing control over non-core Procurement activities which is fine                             1 
2                3                4                5           N/A 
2                3                4                5           N/A 
 
15. What is the primary business of your firm (select ONE from list below)? 
Garments Industries Hotel & Accommodation Ser. 
Food products Electric/electronic equipment 
Paper and allied products Life Insurance Companies 
Printing and publishing Instruments and related products 
Chemicals and allied products Communication & related Firms 
Wooden Furniture and allied products Developer and Construction Firms  
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products Wholesale trade - durable goods 
Other (please specify) ___________________________ 
 
Wholesale trade - nondurable goods 
Miscellaneous retail 
Banking 
Insurance                                                     
Educational Ins. 
Health services 
Engineering related services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
16. Please circle a job title from the list below that best describes your position within your organization: 
A. V.P. of Purchasing / Procurement / Supply Management 
B. Director of Purchasing / Procurement / Supply Management 
C. Procurement outsourcing focal point with service provider 
D. Purchasing / Procurement / Supply Manager 
E. Buyer 
F. Other: (please specify) ________________________ 
 
17. Since how many years have you been employed with this firm? 
A. Less than 5 years 
B. More than 5 years but less than 10 years 
C. More than 10 years but less than 15 years 
D. More than 15 years but less than 20 years 
E. More than 20 years 
 
18. What is the total number of employees in your procurement department? 
A. 1 to 25 
B. 26 to 50 
C. 51 to 75 
D. 76 to 100 
E. 100+ 
 
19. Was a third party advising firm engaged to assist in the outsourcing process? 
Yes No 
Thank you for your participation. 
Please use space below to provide any comments you might have. 
COMMENTS: 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you would like to receive a summary of the primary results, please attach your business card or provide your name / e-mail address in a separate sheet while returning the 
completed questionnaire. The business card or name / e-mail address will be separated from the questionnaire; thus your identity will in no way be linked to your responses 
while performing data analysis and preparing the findings from the study. 
 
